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I. INTRODUCTION
Globalization means more trade, easier communications,
faster means of transportation, increased international commerce,
and also more litigation for U.S. companies conducting business
overseas. Because no courts have worldwide jurisdiction to resolve
disputes among private individuals who are nationals of two or
more states, a national forum must resolve these disputes. Cur-
rently, there are no international treaties that provide for the
international transfer of cases or address the issue of convenience
in international disputes. Therefore, international plaintiffs have
engaged in what has been called "international forum shopping,"
choosing the forum most convenient and beneficial to their case.
For a variety of reasons, the U.S. courts are often the preferred
forum for plaintiffs in international disputes. International forum
shopping may occur in the following situations:1 (1) when a foreign
defendant manufactures, produces or sells a product that injures a
U.S. subject overseas (in this case, the U.S. plaintiff could choose
to sue in the United States or in the foreign forum); (2) when a
U.S. subject is injured overseas by a product manufactured by a
foreign nonresident defendant (in this case, long-arm statutes
may apply);2 or (3) when a foreign plaintiff is injured overseas by a
1. See Linda J. Silberman, Developments in Jurisdiction and Forum Non
Conveniens in International Litigation: Thoughts on Reform and a Proposal for a
Uniform Standard, 28 TEX. INT'L L.J. 501, 502 (1993).
2. See Daniel J. Dorward, The Forum Non Conveniens Doctrine and the Judicial
2005]
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product manufactured either in the United States or overseas by a
U.S. defendant.' In the wake of lawsuits brought by foreign pri-
vate plaintiffs in international mass tort cases against U.S.
defendants,4 U.S. courts have consistently prevented foreign
plaintiffs from trying their cases in U.S. fora, invoking the forum
non conveniens doctrine (FNC). Rightly, FNC disputes have been
called a "marathon struggle."5 Since the late 1980s, Latin America
has eliminated restrictions on foreign investment and foreign
trade. Increased trade in Latin America has created more busi-
ness opportunities for U.S. corporations, as well as an increased
risk of litigation. In recent years, Latin American plaintiffs have
Protection of Multinational Corporations from Forum Shopping Plaintiffs, 19 U. PA. J.
INT'L ECON. L. 141, 143-144 (1998) ("Many states' long-arm statutes grant jurisdiction
to the fullest extent allowed by the U.S. Constitution and most other states come close
to granting jurisdiction to the limits of due process."); Glenn R. Sarno, Haling Foreign
Subsidiary Corporations into Court Under the 1934: Jurisdictional Bases and Forum
Non Conveniens, 55-AUT LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 379, 398 (1992) ("National courts
retaining considerable discretion in exercising long-arm jurisdiction, especially those
with rigid or unrestricted jurisdictional laws, should not be unduly provoked into
broader assertions of jurisdiction over U.S. citizens. Considering the alternative
forum's jurisdictional laws and other matters of policy, a U.S. court may be better
served by allowing a foreign judiciary to resolve the litigation."); Alex W. Albright, In
Personam Jurisdiction: A Confused and Inappropriate Substitute for Forum Non
Conveniens, 71 TEx. L. REV. 351, 368 n.94 (1993) (stating that Texas also has
specialized long-arm statutes). See generally David E. Seidelson, Jurisdiction Over
Nonresident Defendants: Beyond "Minimum Contacts" and the Long-Arm Statutes, 6
DUQ. L. REV. 221, (1968), cited in Ralph U. Whitten, U.S. Conflict-of-Laws Doctrine
and Forum Shopping, International and Domestic (Revisited), 37 TEX. INT'L L.J. 559,
588 n.161 (2002). For recent developments in the application of long-arm statutes to
foreign defendants, see generally Lisa Savitt & Melissa Pierre, Personal Jurisdiction
and the Foreign Defendant, INTERNATIONAL LAW NEWS, Vol. 34, No. 4 (Fall 2005),
available at http://www.blankrome.com/publications/Articles/PersonalJurisdiction.
ILN.34.4.Fal12005.pdf.
3. Under the "piercing the corporate veil" doctrine, the U.S. defendant can be a
corporation, including its foreign subsidiaries or affiliates. See Sandra K. Miller,
Piercing the Corporate Veil Among Affiliated Companies in the European Community
and in the U.S.: A Comparative Analysis of U.S., German, and U.K Veilpiercing
Approaches, 36 AM. Bus. L.J. 73, 76, 80 (1998); see also Daniel G. Brown, Jurisdiction
Over a Corporation on the Basis of the Contacts of an Affiliated Corporation: Do You
Have to Pierce the Corporate Veil?, 61 U. Cin. L. REV. 595, 596-601 (1992).
4. "Many product injuries are inflicted in the process of obtaining natural
resources, harnessing and transporting those resources, and processing those
resources for a product. Such injuries often result from U.S. companies' activities
abroad related to the production of a product for domestic or international
consumption." Jeffrey A. Van Detta, Justice Restored: Using A Preservation-of-Court-
Access Approach to Replace Forum Non Conveniens in Five International Product-
Injury Case Studies, 24 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 53, 95 (2003).
5. Lacey v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 932 F.2d 170, 172 (3d Cir. 1991), quoted in
Douglas W. Dunham & Eric F. Gladbach, Forum Non Conveniens and Foreign
Plaintiffs in the 1990s, 24 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 665, 697 n.217 (1999).
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brought a growing number of lawsuits against U.S. corporate
defendants in U.S. fora arising from events occurring in Latin
America.6 U.S. courts have consistently dismissed almost all of
these lawsuits based on FNC.7
International product injury cases that involve numerous
plaintiffs are the main context where FNC dismissals have
occurred in Latin America. In fact, FNC has been used by U.S.
courts to dismiss suits brought by Latin American plaintiffs when
the following elements are present in an international dispute: (1)
when products manufactured or distributed by a U.S. defendant,
usually a multinational corporation doing business in Latin
America, injure a Latin American plaintiff; (2) when the Latin
American plaintiff is not a U.S. citizen or lawful resident and sues
the U.S. defendant in a U.S. court; (3) when the Latin American
plaintiff alleges that a tort or a breach of a contract occurred in
Latin America; (4) when there are no international treaties, either
multilateral or bilateral, in force between the U.S. and the plain-
tiffs home country providing equal access to courts for the nation-
als of both countries; and (5) when the U.S. court dismisses the
Latin American plaintiffs complaint based on FNC.5
The effect, both intended and inadvertent, of the FNC doc-
trine has been to shield U.S. multinational corporations con-
ducting business in Latin America from liability resulting from
torts or product injury caused to Latin American plaintiffs by bar-
ring access to U.S. courts. FNC dismissals force Latin American
plaintiffs to re-file their complaints in their home fora. Latin
American jurisdictions have responded, in turn, by refusing to
hear remanded cases on various grounds, the principal ground
6. See Dorward, supra note 2, at 150 n.65 ("In an effort to take advantage of the
less stringent burden of proof under American products liability law ... an increasing
number of foreign plaintiffs are instituting products liability suits in the United
States." (quoting Sheila L. Birnbaum & Douglas W. Dunham, Foreign Plaintiffs and
Forum Non Conveniens, 16 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 241, 243 (1990))).
7. Defendants can also engage in international forum shopping, in what is called
"reverse forum shopping." See Alan Reed, To Be or Not To Be: The Forum Non
Conveniens Performance Acted Out on Anglo-American Courtroom Stages, 29 GA. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 31, 42 (2000) ("A properly structured denial of forum non conveniens
dismissal would be beneficial in that it would prevent improper reverse forum-
shopping by U.S. defendants.").
8. See Alejandro M. Garro, Forum Non Conveniens: "Availability" and
"Adequacy" of Latin American Fora from a Comparative Perspective, 35 U. MIAMI
INTER-AM. L. REV. 65, 98 (2003-2004) ("The unilateral submission of the defendant to
the jurisdiction of the transferee court, coupled with the forced submission of the
plaintiff, who is sent to its own home courts after a dismissal on FNC grounds, is
insufficient to create jurisdiction 'by consent.'").
1232005]
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being that the plaintiffs' re-filing was not a product of their free
will and is thus null and void. This impasse is still current, and
there seems to be no way out of it.
In this context, this article analyzes current developments in
the FNC doctrine as applicable to Latin America, and the different
options available to address the FNC deadlock between Latin
America and the United States. This review takes into account
both the real causes and consequences of FNC dismissals, as well
as the ways to tackle the challenges originating from those dismis-
sals. The FNC doctrine emerged as a unilateral response to an
international legal conflict.9 Unfortunately, international law,
both statutory and customary, does not provide an answer to
international forum shopping concerning Latin American plain-
tiffs suing U.S. defendants in U.S. courts based on torts occurring
in Latin America. FNC is only tangentially regulated by interna-
tional law by means of bilateral treaties such as treaties of friend-
ship, commerce, and navigation, containing clauses granting the
parties' citizens "free and open access to the courts of justice" in
their countries. But these treaties have generally not been applied
in FNC analyses by U.S. courts. Therefore, the natural way out of
the FNC impasse would be through international treaties between
the United States and Latin American countries. Bilateral trea-
ties between the United States and Latin American countries that
address FNC issues would bring an improvement in the Latin
American legal and judicial systems through the standardization
of laws and procedures. A further positive effect of bilateral trea-
ties on the enforcement of Latin American awards before U.S.
courts is the application of the comity principle. But this possibil-
ity does not seem to have been realistically explored yet.
As stated above, this paper proposes that the best approach to
solving the FNC impasse would be through international treaties
among the United States and Latin American countries. In the
absence of such treaties, only unilateral alternatives are availa-
ble. Unilateral measures, both judicial and legislative, adopted by
Latin American countries have largely been unsuccessful, and
Latin American plaintiffs have not been generally able to re-file
their lawsuits in U.S. courts after being dismissed in Latin
America. Reality has shown that U.S. courts are unlikely to re-
take cases dismissed on jurisdictional grounds by Latin American
courts.
9. See Reed, supra note 7, at 77.
124
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On the other hand, unilateral options in the United States
might come from the judicial or legislative branches. Federal leg-
islation would provide uniformity to the application of the FNC
doctrine, but U.S. courts would likely still find interpretations to
avoid docket congestions caused by foreign lawsuits. Conse-
quently, this paper argues that the solution to the FNC dilemma
must come from inside U.S. courts through a re-interpretation of
the FNC doctrine, restricting its application to exceptional situa-
tions with a higher burden of proof on the shoulders of U.S. corpo-
rate defendants doing business in Latin America.
Part II reviews the U.S. law on conflicts of jurisdiction involv-
ing foreign plaintiffs in the context of the FNC doctrine. This part
provides the context of the FNC doctrine as an example of the pro-
cedural tools available for dismissing international litigation in
the United States. This chapter also draws a parallel with the
Latin American Calvo doctrine. Part III states the current rules
on FNC in the United States, its origin, elements, areas of applica-
tion, leading case law, the private and public interest analysis,
comparison with jurisdictional and venue issues, leading U.S. case
law on FNC, deference to plaintiffs according to their citizenship,
the private-public interests analysis which lies at the core of the
FNC doctrine, the policy arguments behind FNC, conditional dis-
missals, and the appellate standard for the review of FNC dismis-
sals. Part IV analyzes with the factors that influence the
determination of whether Latin American fora are adequate and
available in FNC determinations. Part V discusses the Latin
American rule on jurisdiction, the consequences of FNC dismis-
sals in Latin America, and the responses to FNC in the form of
judicial retaliation and blocking statutes. Part VI focuses on pro-
posals for the re-formulation of the FNC doctrine in the United
States, and also offers views on the avenues available in Latin
America for the FNC impasse. Finally, the article concludes that a
more lasting solution to the FNC impasse should come from
within the judiciary of the United States or new international
treaties.
II. UNITED STATES LAW ON CONFLICTS OF JURISDICTION
INVOLVING FOREIGN PLAINTIFFS
A. Forum Non Conveniens as a Procedural Tool to
Dismiss International Litigation
U.S. courts have developed several theories, besides FNC, to
ensure that Latin American plaintiffs do not have access to U.S.
20051
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fora. 0 In general terms, when a U.S. investor is adversely affected
by the acts of a foreign sovereign, he has the alternative of filing
his suit in the United States or abroad. The context of these dis-
putes usually arises out of expropriations by a sovereign, or in
cases of antitrust violations, by a foreign private competitor. 1 In
cases where a foreign sovereign is involved, U.S. courts generally
decline jurisdiction based on considerations of immunity, the sep-
aration of powers doctrine, international comity," the act of state
doctrine, 3 or judicial abstention. 4
Besides these theories, U.S. courts have also issued antisuit
injunctions, as a form of injunctive relief, to prevent foreign plain-
tiffs from filing their suits in a foreign forum." In general terms,
there are two approaches to antisuit injunctions. On one hand, a
liberal view analyzes whether the "foreign litigation would: (1)
frustrate a policy of the forum issuing the injunction; (2) be vexa-
tious or oppressive; (3) threaten the issuing court's in rem or quasi
in rem, jurisdiction; or (4) where the proceedings prejudice other
equitable considerations." 6 On the other hand, in the restrictive
approach, parties are enjoined "from prosecuting parallel actions
in foreign courts only for one of two reasons: (1) when it is neces-
sary to protect the forum's jurisdiction over the matter at issue, or
(2) when it is necessary to protect important public policies of the
10. See Van Detta, supra note 4, at 96, with respect to the principle of
international comity. For other alternatives, such as the commencement of parallel
proceedings, motion to stay or dismiss on grounds of parallel foreign proceeding, and
anti-suit injunctions, see generally John Fellas, Choice of Forum in International
Litigation, 721 PLI/LIT 261 (2005).
11. Margaret A. Niles, Judicial Balancing of Foreign Policy Considerations:
Comity and Errors Under the Act of State Doctrine, 35 STAN. L. REV. 327, 339-41
(1983) (noting that not all foreign sovereigns are treated the same).
12. See Jeremy C. Bates, Comment, Home Is Where the Hurt Is: Forum Non
Conveniens and Antitrust, 2000 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 281, 312 ("Forum non conveniens
differs markedly from comity (or the rule of reason). In substance, forum non
conveniens primarily assesses an American forum's convenience to the court, the
parties, and the jury-serving public; the inquiry also asks whether evidence is
available in the forum and whether the U.S. court can easily administer the case.
Comity and the rule of reason, by contrast, incorporate conflict-of-laws principles and
diplomatic deference. At its core, comity urges that each sovereign recognize and
respect acts of other sovereigns.").
13. Niles, supra note 11, at 328.
14. Id. at 353-56.
15. David J. Levy, Antisuit Injunctions in Multinational Cases, in INTERNATIONAL
LITIGATION, DEFENDING AND SUING FOREIGN PARTIES IN U.S. FEDERAL COURTS 163,
163 (David J. Levy, ed., 2003) ("Parties may seek the antisuit injunctions in American
courts, or they may seek injunctions in foreign courts.").
16. Id. at 165 (quoting In re Unterweser Reederei, 428 F.2d 888, 890 (5th Cir.
1970)).
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forum court."17 The Sixth Circuit, in Gau Shan Co. v. Bankers
Trust Co., laid out the difference in the standards for deciding
FNC motions and antisuit injunctions, where the court stated that
"... [t] he policies of avoiding hardships to the parties and promot-
ing the economics of consolidated legislation should be used when
deciding a motion for dismissal of forum non conveniens, not a
motion for a foreign antisuit injunction.""
Parallel to antisuit injunctions, U.S. defendants have used
other procedural alternatives to prevent foreign plaintiffs from
using U.S. fora, such as a motion to stay or dismiss on grounds of
a parallel foreign proceeding, 19 a motion to dismiss for lack of sub-
ject matter or personal jurisdiction, and the motion to dismiss
based on the forum non conveniens doctrine. This paper focuses on
this last option.
B. Forum Non Conveniens and the Calvo Doctrine
Since the inception of the newly independent Latin American
countries, U.S. investors conducting business in Latin America
have usually made resource to diplomatic protection from the U.S.
government when they saw their interests in jeopardy. In the late
19th century, Carlos Calvo, an Argentinean diplomat, proposed a
doctrine (the "Calvo" doctrine) ° that became the standard
response from Latin American governments when U.S. investors
sought to avoid Latin American jurisdictions to solve their griev-
ances against sovereigns and, more commonly, against state-
owned companies. These disputes almost always originated in the
expropriation of U.S. interests. The Calvo doctrine has two guid-
ing principles. The first states that before recurring to diplomatic
protection, foreign investors must exhaust the local remedies in
the host country: " . . . aliens should not be granted more rights
and privileges than those accorded nationals, thus restricting
aliens to seek redress for their grievances before the respective
domestic tribunals under the respective domestic laws."2 Calvo's
second principle is that "foreign states may not enforce their citi-
zens' private claims by violating territorial sovereignty of host
17. Id. at 168.
18. Id. at 172 (citing Gau Shan Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 956 F.2d 1349, 1355 (6th
Cir. 1992)).
19. See Fellas, supra note 10, at 293.
20. Doak Bishop, The United States' Perspective Toward International Arbitration
with Latin American Parties, 8-AUT INT'L L. PRACTICUM 63 (1995).
21. Eduardo A. Wiesner, Ancom: A New Attitude Toward Foreign Investment?, 24
U. MLAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 435, 437 (1993).
2005] 127
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states, either through diplomatic [protection] or forceful
intervention."22
Only the first principle of the Calvo Doctrine is relevant for a
comparison with the FNC analysis because it addresses the situa-
tion where nationals from two different countries have the possi-
bility of filing their suits in two different fora. The common
element between Calvo and FNC is that both are responses to
international forum shopping conflicts. However, both doctrines
differ in many ways and should not be confused, namely: (1) FNC
arises when a claim is filed against a U.S. investor doing business
in Latin America; in Calvo, it is the foreign investor who raises a
claim against the Latin American sovereign, usually based on the
direct or indirect expropriation of property; (2) in FNC, a Latin
American plaintiff seeks redress in a U.S. court, while in Calvo a
U.S. plaintiff is barred from seeking redress in a U.S. court
against a Latin American sovereign without first exhausting the
domestic remedies in the host country; (3) in FNC, the plaintiff is
a Latin American, while in Calvo the plaintiff is a U.S. citizen; (4)
in Calvo, the U.S. forum is deemed to be convenient for the U.S.
plaintiff, whereas in FNC the U.S. forum is deemed to be inconve-
nient for the U.S. plaintiff; (5) the FNC defense is raised by the
U.S. defendant against a foreign private plaintiff, and in Calvo the
defense is raised by a Latin American defendant against a foreign
private plaintiff; (6) FNC requires an analysis of the Latin Ameri-
can forum to determine its adequacy and availability, whereas in
Calvo no such analysis is made since the Latin American forum is
presumed as a matter of right to be adequate and available to for-
eign plaintiffs; (7) in Calvo, the U.S. party claims that the Latin
American forum is inconvenient and therefore unavailable,
whereas in FNC the U.S. party sustains that the Latin American
forum is convenient and thus available; (8) the Calvo defense can-
not be waived by the individual23 (the Latin American party), but
there are no limitations for a private party to waive the FNC
defense; (9) according to international treaties, international law,
U.S. statutes and case law, foreign sovereigns cannot be sued in a
U.S. court without their consent,24 while the FNC defense is not
available for foreign sovereign defendants in the United States;
(10) FNC arises before there has been a final judgment on the
merits of the case, whereas, to apply Calvo requires a final deci-
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1330 (2005).
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sion on the merits, that is, an exhaustion of local remedies; and
(11) Calvo acts as a deterrent to foreign investment in Latin
America since it makes U.S. defendants amenable in Latin Ameri-
can courts, while FNC does not have that effect.
Despite being two completely different answers to the prob-
lem of having more than one available forum in disputes involving
U.S. and Latin American parties, certain similarities exist
between Calvo and FNC. In effect, disputes between a U.S. party
and a Latin American party can be submitted, with prior agree-
ment, to international arbitration. These disputes can arise both
in the context of Calvo and FNC. Also, FNC has the potential
effect of justice denial" for the Latin American party, as it occurs
with Calvo for the U.S. investor. Nevertheless, both doctrines
remain different and should not be confused for purposes of this
analysis.
III. CURRENT LAW ON FORUM NON CONVENIENS IN THE
UNITED STATES26
A. The Forum Non Conveniens Doctrine in
International Lawsuits
Neither the United States Constitution nor federal statutes
address the issue of jurisdiction in cases where foreign plaintiffs
sue United States citizens or lawful residents based on a tort that
occurred overseas. Therefore, for the most part, the FNC doctrine
is judge-made law.27 In its essence, FNC gives courts discretional
25. "In international law, denial of justice means that 'the state's responsibility is
engaged by every act (or omission) on the part of officials charged with administering
justice to aliens which fails to meet certain reasonable civilized standards, regardless
of its propriety as tested by the respondent state's national law.'" Wiesner, supra note
21, at 459 n.174 (quoting Alwyn V. Freeman, Recent Aspects of the Calvo Doctrine and
the Challenge to International Law, 40 AM. J. INT'L L. 121, 132 (1946)).
26. "The FNC rule was largely the brainchild of Paxton Blair, a young associate
laboring in a silk-stocking Manhattan law firm. His 1929 law review article . ..
deplored an alleged crisis in docket overcrowding in the Manhattan federal and state
courts of his day and proposed FNC as a panacea." Van Detta, supra note 4, at 60.
The FNC doctrine was first articulated by Justice Robert H. Jackson, "who authored
the 1947 Gilbert opinion that engrafted the FNC rule into the American legal
system." Id. at 58.
27. See Anne McGinness Kearse, Forfeiting the Home-Court Advantage: The
Federal Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 49 S.C.L. REV. 1303, 1305 (1998) ("Forum
non conveniens is a common-law doctrine that originated in Scottish common law and
was first introduced into American law through state courts in the early 1900s."); see
also Peter J. Carney, Comment, International Forum Non Conveniens: "Section
1404.5"- A Proposal in the Interest of Sovereignty, Comity, and Individual Justice, 45
AM. U. L. REV. 415, 425 (1995) ("The Scots created the doctrine to counter undue
2005] 129
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power to discriminate on the basis of the plaintiffs citizenship in
order to retain jurisdiction over a case.2" In fact, courts give United
States plaintiffs greater deference than non-United States plain-
tiffs when choosing a forum.29
[Courts therefore] give greater deference to a plaintiffs
forum choice to the extent that it was motivated by legiti-
mate reasons, including the plaintiffs convenience and the
ability of a U.S. resident plaintiff to obtain jurisdiction over
the defendant, and diminishing deference to a plaintiffs
forum choice to the extent that it was motivated by tactical
advantage. °
In fact, the Second Circuit has stated:
[Deference is not accorded based on] bias in favor of U.S.
residents. It is rather because the greater the plaintiffs ties
to the plaintiffs chosen forum, the more likely it is that the
plaintiff would be inconvenienced by a requirement to bring
the claim in a foreign jurisdiction. Also, while our courts
are of course required to offer equal justice to all litigants,
... a neutral rule that compares the convenience of the par-
ties should properly consider each party's residence as a
factor that bears on the inconvenience that party might suf-
fer if required to sue in a foreign nation. 1
Therefore, the problem with FNC seems to be its lack of predict-
ability arising from the broad discretion given to trial courts, and
the lack of de novo review of FNC decisions by appellate courts.
32
For foreign plaintiffs, the FNC doctrine regulates access to
U.S. courts. With respect to Latin America, federal and state
courts apply the FNC doctrine either when they are petitioned by
a United States defendant or ex sua sponte in the following cir-
cumstances: (1) the United States defendant, usually a multina-
hardship arising from the arrestment ad fundadam jurisdiction created by the
attachment and seizure of foreign assets in order to force foreigners into the Scottish
courts.").
28. Christine Russell, Comment, Should Florida be a "Courthouse for the World?":
The Florida Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens and Foreign Plaintiffs, 10 FLA. J.
INT'L L. 353, 362-63 (1995) ("The Houston standard was a sanctuary for foreign
plaintiffs; however, the Florida standard, like the federal standard, will now leave the
issue of whether a foreign plaintiff may litigate in the United States at the trial
court's discretion. It is not only the new discretion awarded to Florida courts which
induces dismissal, but also the instant court's focus on the need to dispense with the
inconvenience of Florida becoming a 'courthouse for the world."').
29. See Koster v. (Am.) Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 524 (1947).
30. Iragorri v. United Techs. Corp. 274 F.3d 65, 73 (2d Cir. 2001).
31. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000).
32. See Carney, supra note 27, at 428, 491.
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tional corporation doing business in Latin America, causes injury
abroad; (2) the Latin American plaintiff sues the United States
defendant in a United States court; (3) the Latin American defen-
dant alleges that a breach of contract or a tort occurred in Latin
America; (4) there are no international treaties, either multilat-
eral or bilateral, between the United States and the plaintiffs
country that provides equal access to United States courts;33 and
(5) the U.S. court dismisses the Latin American plaintiffs com-
plaint based on FNC.
In these cases, the FNC doctrine acts as a jurisdictional rule
that bars access to United States courts. Unlike in the United
States system, a FNC dismissal of an international lawsuit does
not transfer venue. That is, foreign plaintiffs do not have the
option, as United States plaintiffs do, of re-filing their lawsuits in
another venue within the United States. Basically, Latin Ameri-
can plaintiffs must re-file their lawsuits in their own country's
courts.
Latin American plaintiffs have tried to persuade United
States courts to retain jurisdiction over cases involving FNC dis-
putes in product-injury cases, claiming that the United States is
the convenient forum. They have argued that the U.S. public
maintains an interest in regulating malfunctioning products that
injure foreign citizens to prevent similar situations on United
States soil.
34
B. Forum Non Conveniens Dismissals
The ultimate questions in a FNC analysis are the following:
(1) for which litigant is the chosen forum 'non conveniens;' and (2)
what are the options available for an international litigant whose
claim is dismissed under FNC in the United States. With respect
to the first question, case law broadly shows the relativity of the
answers - the answers, in essence, vary depending on whom is
asked. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that "[c]ourts should be
mindful that, just as plaintiffs sometimes choose a forum for
forum-shopping reasons, defendants may also move for dismissal
under '[FNC] not because of genuine concern with convenience but
33. See Reyno v. Piper Aircraft Co., 630 F.2d 149, 170-71 (3d Cir. 1980); see
generally Jacqueline Duval-Major, One Way Ticket Home: The Federal Doctrine of
Forum Non Conveniens and the International Plaintiff, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 650
(1992).
34. See Van Detta, supra note 4, at 54, 56-57.
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because of similar forum-shopping reasons. '' 35 In typical FNC
cases involving a Latin American plaintiff, U.S. courts conclude
that the U.S. forum is a forum non conveniens for the U.S. defen-
dant (citizen or lawful resident), 6 and that the Latin American
forum is a forum conveniens for the Latin American defendant. 7
Latin American courts, conversely, hold that the Latin American
forum is a forum non conveniens for a Latin American plaintiff,
and the U.S. forum is a forum conveniens for the U.S. defendant.
Therefore, in every FNC analysis there are two irreconcilable
approaches, and creative solutions have yet to be found.
Regarding the second question, the options available for a liti-
gant whose claim is dismissed under FNC, the alternatives are
very limited.39 Latin American courts can either accept jurisdic-
tion over a case remanded under FNC by a U.S. court, or refuse to
assert jurisdiction over the case.4" Dismissals have occurred on
35. Van Detta, supra note 4, at 81 (quoting Iragorri v. United Techs. Corp., 274
F.3d 65, 75 (2d Cir. 2001)).
36. See Reed, supra note 7, at 60 ("A U.S. plaintiff bringing an action against a
foreign defendant can expect prima facie weight to be accorded to their selection of
U.S. venue. Such respect is contumeliously rejected to foreign plaintiffs suing U.S.
defendants, in that they are pejoratively relegated to the status of illegal immigrants
before U.S. courts."); see also Garro, supra note 8, at 72 ("If a dismissal on grounds of
FNC compels the parties to file suit in a foreign forum, it is important to determine
whether the U.S. defendants, having no contacts in any Latin American country in
particular, may be subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of that country.").
37. See Margaret G. Stewart, Forum Non Conveniens: A Doctrine in Search of a
Role, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1259, 1282 (1986) ("At first blush, it would seem that a
defendant sued at home would not be able to make the kind of showing of
inconvenience necessary to a forum non conveniens dismissal. Evidence, witnesses,
and the source of applicable law might all be foreign, but the defendant is in the
forum and could hardly maintain that she is unduly burdened by being forced to
defend on her 'home turf.' Unfortunately, the relationship between citizenship and
convenience is not so clear cut, and dismissals of claims against citizens of the forum
on grounds of forum non conveniens do occur. If, in fact, the doctrine currently serves
no useful purpose, then either such decisions are wrong or jurisdiction based upon
citizenship ought not to be always valid."); see also Carney, supra note 27, at 424
("[T]he doctrine is a response to the situation where a plaintiff assumes considerable
inconvenience to sue the defendant in a forum which has virtually no relation to the
cause of action in order to impose on the defendant a similar or greater
inconvenience.").
38. See Katherine B. Wilmore et al., Developments in the Doctrine of Forum Non
Conveniens, 39 INT'L LAw. 297, 303 (2005) ("The common law doctrine of forum non
conveniens allows dismissal of a case even though a court has subject matter
jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, and proper venue, provided there is another court
which is 'available' and 'adequate' that would also be more 'convenient' or better serve
the interests of justice.").
39. See Dorward, supra note 2, at 166.
40. See, e.g., Garro, supra note 8, at 75 ("In a judgment delivered in 1995, a Costa
Rican court of first instance refused to take jurisdiction over a case which had been
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two grounds: (1) according to jurisdictional principles applicable
in the home jurisdiction, which state that the domestic court lacks
jurisdiction because the foreign forum is the proper one, and
resorting to the domestic court was not the product of the plain-
tiffs free will;41 or (2) as it will be addressed later in this article,
dismissals have been based on special legislation passed by Latin
American countries as a reaction to U.S. FNC dismissals. 2
C. Areas Where Forum Non Conveniens Has Been
Applied by United States Courts
FNC has been applied in different contexts by U.S. courts. In
general, courts have ruled that FNC dismissals are unavailable in
all of the following contexts: international human rights law; 3
international antitrust and securities law;44 international employ-
previously dismissed by the District Court of Texas on FNC grounds."); see also
Melissa Leigh Lauderdale, Forum Selection Clauses and Forum Non Conveniens in
International Employment Contracts, 4 J. INT'L L. & PRAc. 117, 142 n.138 (1995)
("The dismissals for expiration of the statute of limitations were made despite the fact
that the defendants had waived that defense as a prerequisite for dismissal in the
United States. The foreign court refused to accept the waiver."); Bernard H. Oxman,
Comments on Forum Non Conveniens Issues in International Cases, 35 U. MIAMI
INTER-AM. L. REV. 123, 127 (2003-2004) ("I am not an expert in civil law concepts of
judicial jurisdiction, but I must confess that I would be astonished to learn that,
because of such 'compulsion,' a court in a civil law country would refuse to hear a case
because it was dismissed by the courts of another country on grounds such as lack of
competence or lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendant.").
41. See Henry Saint Dahl, Forum Non Conveniens, Latin America and Blocking
Statutes, 35 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 21, 35 n.63 (2003-2004) ("FNC also violates
Latin American notions of procedural freedom.").
42. See id. at app.; see also Garro, supra note 8, at 78; Bates, supra note 12, at 323
("Several governments have enacted "blocking" statutes that limit the ability of their
citizens to obey U.S. discovery rules.").
43. See Kathryn Boyd, The Inconvenience of Victims: Abolishing Forum Non
Conveniens in U.S. Human Rights Litigation, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 41, 44 (1998); see also
Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000) (cited in RALPH
STEINHARDT, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION: CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE RISE OF
INTERMESTIC LAw 122-129 (2002)).
44. Sarno, supra note 2, at 383 ("Because section 27 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 provides for worldwide service of process and extends personal
jurisdiction to the limits of due process, the plaintiffs showing must consist of
evidence that the foreign subsidiary has sufficient minimum contacts with the United
States as a whole to make the exercise of jurisdiction fair and reasonable"); id. at 391
("The minimum contacts analysis and the forum non conveniens analysis ultimately
ask whether compelling the appearance of defendants in a U.S. court would be fair
and reasonable. Operating together, those two inquiries provide a two-level system of
checks on the extension of personal jurisdiction over foreign corporations.") (footnote
omitted); see also R. Maganlal & Co. v, M.G. Chem Co., 942 F.2d 164, 167 (2d Cir.
1991), cited in Boosey & Hawkes v. Walt Disney Co., 145 F.3d 481 (2d Cir. 1998).
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ment contracts; 45 admiralty cases;41 and RICO litigation.47 For
example, in international antitrust cases, federal courts have
faced the following dilemma: do applicable statutes "require that
they hear antitrust actions that courts would otherwise dismiss
under forum non conveniens in favor of a foreign court, or do
courts retain the discretion to dismiss?"4 The answer, which could
go in both directions, depends on whether applicable legislation
(the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act, respectively) derogated, or
was derogated by, the FNC doctrine when that legislation was
passed.49
This article does not address FNC law in these areas, but only
in the context of liability originated by product injury overseas
(the so called "international mass tort cases"),5° or when the dam-
ages arise out of contract noncompliance and the parties have not
agreed on a contractual choice of forum clause. 1 In the latter case,
if the defendant is sued in the contractually chosen forum, she can
object to the court's jurisdiction based on grounds such as the lack
of minimum contacts between the plaintiff and the chosen forum,52
the nullity of the forum selection clause,53 or the "non convenience"
of the chosen forum. But, as already stated, FNC usually arises in
the context of product injury caused by manufacturers and distrib-
45. See generally Lauderdale, supra note 40.
46. Dorward, supra note 2, at 158 ("For over a century, courts have applied forum
non conveniens and similar doctrines in admiralty cases involving foreign parties.
Courts of equity exercised the power to decline, in the interests of justice, cases over
which they had jurisdiction, especially cases between aliens.").
47. Bates, supra note 12, at 294, 324.
48. Id. at 291.
49. Id. at 286.
50. The most common grounds over which international tort cases are brought
are: negligence, products liability for defective design and manufacture, strict
liability, public and private nuisance, and trespass. See generally Christopher M.
Marlowe, Comment, Forum Non Conveniens Dismissals and the Adequate Alternative
Forum: Latin America, 32 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 295 (2001).
51. "Even when the parties attempt by contract to pre-select a forum for the
resolution of disputes, the court may nonetheless invoke its discretionary power to
dismiss the case." STEINnARDT, supra note 43, at 109.
52. See Peter J. Kalis & Thomas M. Reiter, Forum Non Conveniens: A Case
Management Tool for Comprehensive Environmental Insurance CoverageActions?, 92
W. VA. L. REV. 391, 402 (1989-1990); see also Sarno, supra note 2, at 381; Lauderdale,
supra note 40, at 147 ("Specifically, forum non conveniens analysis should include the
plaintiffs and defendant's contacts with the forum as additional separate factors in a
forum non conveniens analysis."); Kearse, supra note 27, at 1311 ("Nevertheless, a
court may grant a motion to dismiss when a defendant is subject to jurisdiction but
lacks sufficient contacts for the court to exercise jurisdiction under the forum non
conveniens analysis."); Stewart, supra note 37, at 1265.
53. "The United States Supreme Court has declared forum selection clauses
presumptively valid." Lauderdale, supra note 40, at 120.
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utors, and it is in this context where most of the case law on FNC
is found.54
D. Forum Non Conveniens, Jurisdiction, and Venue
Issues
FNC has to do with jurisdictional issues, not with venue
issues. Venue issues arise after it has been established that a
court has jurisdiction to hear a case and has the power to actually
try it. FNC points to denial of all jurisdiction of a court to hear a
case. Likewise, no issues of competence (competencia) arise in the
context of FNC dismissals.
55
For purposes of domestic FNC analysis in the United States,
the determination of the defendant's domicile or residence is fun-
damental. In general, an individual or corporation is domiciled
where it is incorporated, has its principal place of business, is
served with process, is registered to do business, or solicits busi-
ness.5 6 In all of these cases, the local court has jurisdiction over the
defendant when such a connection between the defendant and the
state exists.5 7 State statutes do not condition such jurisdiction on
whether the cause of action arose in the United States or overseas.
Citizenship is the strongest ground for a court to assert jurisdic-
tion over the defendant.
[In that case,] [h]er contact with it is continuous, and by
virtue of her citizenship, she claims the benefits and protec-
tions of the forum's law .... To permit a citizen to be sued
at home, even on a cause of action that arose from her
activities elsewhere, is to provide a plaintiff with one choice
of forum that is always correct.5"
The FNC doctrine regulates the access to U.S. courts. "Forum
non conveniens presumes two forums in which a plaintiff may
bring its suit, and offers guidelines in making the choice between
them with much discretion left to the trial court. '59 There have
54. See generally WARREN FRIEDMAN, FOREIGN PLAINTIFFS IN PRODUCT LIABILITY
ACTIONS: THE DEFENSE OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS 57-77 (1988).
55. COD. PROC. CIv. art. 101(104)-112(117) (Chile 2005). Competencia is a Latin
American doctrine referring to which court among all those with potential jurisdiction
to hear a case will actually hear it, according to factors such as territory, the sums
involved, etc. It presupposes, therefore, the existence of jurisdiction. In FNC
dismissals, instead, that jurisdiction is completely denied to the U.S. court.
56. Albright, supra note 2, at 370.
57. Id. at 375.
58. Stewart, supra note 37, at 1282.
59. Kalis & Reiter, supra note 52, at 403.
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been calls for substituting this standard of appellate review for
one that provides a de novo review of trial courts dismissals on
FNC.°
In general, requirements of jurisdiction and venue are easily
satisfied before federal and state courts in the United States. 1 In
the absence of complaints over the subject matter 62 or personal
jurisdiction of a court, FNC is the only way for a U.S. court to
dismiss an otherwise valid complaint." At the state level, "[miost
state courts have adopted a forum non conveniens standard very
similar to the federal standard created by Gilbert' and Reyno" ...
[and] .. . [i]n a small number of states, the existence of a forum
non conveniens doctrine is a completely open question."66
When the plaintiff is not a citizen of the forum state, the U.S.
defendant has the possibility of removing (or transferring) the
case to a federal court.67 But a transfer is a transfer, and a dismis-
sal is a dismissal, whether or not it is based on FNC. This means
that a transfer does not have the effect of terminating the case in
a U.S. court. A transfer only establishes the court with proper
jurisdiction to hear a case. A FNC dismissal instead denies a U.S.
forum for the case.
60. Lauderdale, supra note 40, at 132 ("Some commentators argue that de novo
review would be more appropriate than abuse of discretion." (citing Duval-Major,
supra note 33, at 684)).
61. See Anne M. Rodgers, Forum Non Conveniens in International Cases, in
INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION, DEFENDING AND SUING FOREIGN PARTIES IN U.S. FEDERAL
COURTS, supra note 15, at 205 ("There is no statutory mechanism for transferring a
case from a United States court to a foreign forum .... [Miost courts hold that federal
law on forum non conveniens applies to all federal cases, including those removed
from state court.").
62. "Subject-matter jurisdiction is that group of rules that describe the litigation
event from the perspective of the forum court system's competency to exercise
personal and legislative jurisdiction over a litigation event." Jeffrey A. Van Detta, The
Irony of Instrumentalism: Using Dworkin's Principle-Rule Distinction to
Reconceptualize Metaphorically a Substance-Procedure Dissonance Exemplified by
Forum Non Conveniens Dismissals in International Product Injury Cases, 87 MARQ.
L. REV. 425, 491 (2004) (footnote omitted).
63. "[E]xtant scholarship divides roughly into three positions: scholars who argue
that 'properly conducted personal jurisdiction and choice of law inquiries eliminates
the need for [the] forum non conveniens doctrine; scholars who contend that the
currently-constituted FNC 'doctrine . . .provides a mechanism for courts to reach
desirable forum selection results without distorting the doctrine of personal
jurisdiction;' and scholars who would have FNC swallow personal jurisdiction
doctrine altogether." Id. at 436.
64. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947).
65. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
66. Dorward, supra note 2, at 164 (internal quotations omitted).
67. Silberman, supra note 1, at 523.
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However, all of these rules on FNC change when the plaintiff
is a non-U.S. citizen or resident. In fact, in these cases, the FNC
doctrine is a jurisdictional rule used to bar access to U.S. courts to
foreign plaintiffs, and not to adjudicate the case on the merits,
despite the fact that such dismissal may cause a similar effect on
the plaintiffs' view.6" As it occurs in the domestic U.S. system, a
FNC dismissal of an international lawsuit does not operate as a
transfer of venue. 9 In other words, the foreign plaintiff does not
have the option, as the U.S. plaintiff does, of re-filing her suit in
another venue within the United States °.7  Basically, the only
option available to the Latin American plaintiff is to re-file in her
home country jurisdiction.
In order to convince a U.S. court to retain jurisdiction over
cases involving FNC disputes in product-injury cases, Latin Amer-
ican plaintiffs claim that the U.S. is the convenient forum, argu-
ing that the U.S. public has an interest in regulating the
malfunctioning of products that injured foreign citizens in order to
prevent the occurrence of similar situations in U.S. soil.71 This
argument has not been sufficiently persuasive because in cases of
accidents occurring overseas involving U.S.-made technology, U.S.
manufacturers have rushed to determine the causes and fix the
problems in order to avoid the same disasters in the U.S., which
would risk multimillion-dollar litigation. The real reason behind
the Latin American plaintiffs choice of the U.S. forum seems to
have more to do with the advantages of shorter litigation and
higher damage recoveries.
68. See Van Detta, supra note 62, at 433 ("Most notably, federal courts have
applied FNC to dismiss lawsuits instituted by foreign plaintiffs seeking compensation
from MNCs [(Multinational Corporations)] that the courts are otherwise compelled to
hear-compelled in the sense that the procedural rules of court-access (i.e., personal
jurisdiction, legislative jurisdiction, and subject-matter jurisdiction) point to a strong
jurisdictional basis for the forum's courts to decide the plaintiffs claim.").
69. See generally James L. Baudino, Comment, Venue Issues Against Negligent
Carriers-International and Domestic Travel: The Plaintiffs Choice?, 62 J. Air L. &
Com. 163 (1996); Jennifer Merrigan Fay, Comment, Securities-Federal Securities
Law Special Venue Provisions do not Enable Plaintiffs to Avoid Forum Non
Conveniens Dismissals-Howe v. Goldcorp Invs., Ltd., 946 F.2d 944 (1st Cir.1991), 26
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 804 (1992); Ursula Marie Henninger, The Plaintiffs Forum
Shopping Gold Card: Choice of Law in Federal Courts after Transfer of Venue Under
Section 1404(A)-Ferens V. John Deere Co., 26 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 809 (1991).
70. See generally Jeffrey R. Grable, Note, Texas Steps in Harm's Way: Reversible
Error Established when Suit is Transferred From Plaintiffs Original County of
Proper Venue to Another Country of Proper Venue: Wilson v. Texas Parks & Wildlife
Department, 37 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1147 (June 22, 1994), 26 TEX. TECH L. REV. 139
(1995).
71. Carney, supra note 27, at 454.
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E. Leading Case Law on Forum Non Conveniens
The leading case setting the applicable law on FNC is Piper
Aircraft Co. v. Reyno. 2 The Piper analysis underlines the follow-
ing: (1) a plaintiffs choice of forum is accorder less deference when
the plaintiff is foreign; (2) an analysis of the adequacy of the alter-
native forum; (3) a balance of the public and private interests; and
(4) a discretionary standard for FNC dismissals. 3
Piper set the applicable law on FNC, which was later followed
by important decisions on the matter. For example, in Kinney Sys-
tem, Inc. v. Continental Insurance Co.,74 the Florida Supreme
Court summarized the requirements for the FNC doctrine to oper-
ate: "[T]he trial court must find that: (1) an adequate alternative
forum possesses jurisdiction over the whole case; (2) an evaluation
of the parties' 'private interests' demonstrates an alternative
forum in equipoise with that of the plaintiffs chosen forum; (3) the
'factors of public interest' weigh in favor of litigating the case else-
where; and (4) the plaintiff(s) may reinstate the case in the alter-
native forum without "undue inconvenience or prejudice."75
F. Forum Non Conveniens and Deference to Plaintiffs'
According to Citizenship
In its essence, FNC gives trial courts a discretional power to
discriminate on the basis of the plaintiffs citizenship in order to
retain jurisdiction over a case." In fact, according to FNC, a U.S.
plaintiffs choice of forum is entitled to greater deference than a
non U.S. plaintiff.77 "Courts should look at the reasons or motiva-
tion that led the plaintiff to choose a particular forum," to deter-
mine whether a forum was chosen for "legitimate reasons" or for
"tactical advantage."78 In fact, the Second Circuit has affirmed,
rather defensively, the following:
72. 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
73. Van Detta, supra note 4, at 58-59 ("The discretionary nature of the doctrine,
combined with the multifariousness of the factors relevant to its application ... make
uniformity and predictability of outcome almost impossible.").
74. 674 So.2d 86 (Fla. 1996).
75. Id. at 90 (quoting Pain v. United Techns. Corp. 637 F.2d 775, 784-85 (D.C. Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1128 (1981)), quoted in Marlowe, supra note 50, at 298-
99.
76. See generally Russell, supra note 28.
77. See Koster v. (Am.) Lumberments Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518 (1947), cited in
Fellas, supra note 10, at 293.
78. Iragorri v. United Technologies Corp., 274 F.3d 65, 72-73 (2d Cir. 2001), cited
in Fellas, supra note 10, at 298.
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[Tihat is the case not because of chauvinism or bias in favor
of U.S. residents. It is rather because the greater the plain-
tiffs ties to the plaintiffs chosen forum, the more likely
that the plaintiff would be inconvenienced by a require-
ment to bring the claim in a foreign jurisdiction. Also, while
our courts are of course required to offer equal justice to all
litigants, a neutral rule that compares the convenience of
the parties should properly consider each party's residence
as a factor that bears on the inconvenience that party
might suffer if required to sue in a foreign nation.
7 9
Moreover, motions to dismiss on FNC grounds exclude a trial
on the merits, and are generally decided by affidavits made by the
parties' attorneys.80 Therefore, the problem with FNC seems to be
its lack of predictability arising from the broad discretion given to
trial courts, and the lack of de novo review of FNC decisions by
appellate courts."' These factors have created a disparate range of
decisions that deprive FNC law of any certainty.82
G. The Private and Public Interest Analysis as the
Core of Forum Non Conveniens
As first ruled in Piper, the FNC analysis is based on the
pondering of public and private interests in a suit filed by a for-
eign plaintiff against a U.S. defendant."
The private-public interest analysis was first elaborated in
79. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 102 (2d Cir. 2000).
80. Rodgers, supra note 61, at 216.
81. It has been said that, in general, "the principal problem of the FNC rule is its
lack of principle." Van Detta, supra note 4, at 64.
82. For example, in HSBC USA, Inc. v. Prosegur Paraguay S.A, 2004 WL 2210283
(S.D.N.Y. 2004), the Southern District of New York "noted that Paraguay is ranked
the fourth most corrupt country in the world, that denials of fair trials were common
in Paraguay, and that "there is a 'mafia' that controls the judiciary." The court thus
concluded that the defendant had not carried its burden of showing that Paraguay
was an adequate alternative forum and thus was not entitled to dismissal on the
ground of forum non conveniens." Wilmore, supra note 38, at 304 (2005).
83. Kalis & Reiter, supra note 52, at 404 n.46 ("In Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454
U.S. 235 (1981), reh'g denied, 455 U.S. 928 (1982), the Court returned to the doctrine,
and found the Gulf Oil methodology still satisfactory.... In Piper, the Court held that
the court of appeals had erred in assuming that the possibility of an unfavorable
change in law bars dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds. The Court also
concurred with the trial court's determination that the presumption favoring a
plaintiffs choice of forum applied with less force when the plaintiff is a foreigner.")
(citations omitted); see also Van Detta, supra note 62, at 464-465 ("Some corporate
law scholars have proposed greater corporate accountability for tortuous risk-creating
corporate activity because the corporate finances and restructuring of the globalized
era have created 'an unusually strong incentive [for MNCs] to engage in excessively
risky behavior' that results in tortious conduct.").
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Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert.4 In Gilbert, the U.S. Supreme Court
referred to the following private interest factors to be taken into
account by lower courts when conducting a FNC review:
(1) the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (2) the
availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwill-
ing witnesses; (3) the [comparative] cost of obtaining
attendance of willing witnesses; (4) the possibility of view-
ing the premises by the jury; (5) whether any judgment
eventually obtained could be enforced; (6) all other practi-
cal problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious,
and inexpensive."
The public interest factors referred' to were the following:
(1) administrative difficulties flowing from docket conges-
tion; (2) the unfairness of burdening citizens in an unre-
lated forum with jury duty; (3) the local interest in having
localized controversies decided at home; (4) the interest in
having the trial of a diversity case in a forum that is at
familiar with the law that must govern the action; (5) the
avoidance of unnecessary problems in conflicts of laws or in
the application of foreign law; (6) the appropriateness of a
trial in a forum familiar with the law that will govern the
case.
8 6
H. Policy Reasons Behind Forum Non Conveniens
Dismissals
U.S. courts have underscored the effects of litigation brought
by a foreign plaintiff in the United States on U.S. taxpayers, who
generally bear the costs.87 Courts have been eager to halt this
apparent inequity concerning legal resources and potential docket
congestion.8 Not without reason, FNC dismissals are one of the
most effective docket clearing devices.8 9 For example, the Florida
84. 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
85. Van Detta, supra note 4, at 58 n.13 (citing Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 516).
86. Id.
87. See Kalis & Reiter, supra note 52, at 412-13.
88. For example, the Southern District of New York, "one of the busiest districts in
the country," has stated the "need to guard our docket from disputes with little
connection to this forum is clear.. . ." Doe v. Hyland Therapeutics Div., 807 F. Supp.
1117, 1128 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), quoted in Fellas, supra note 10, at 323-324.
89. See Lauderdale, supra note 40, at 146 ("[D]uring the 1970s the federal docket-
congestion problem dramatically increased, and Chief Justice Burger's extremely
public and vigorous campaign to decrease that workload probably helped to remove
any lingering sense that judges might have had that it would be unseemly to make
their own convenience an overt part of the judicial process.").
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Supreme Court has sustained:
[W]hile it is true that the Florida Constitution guarantees
every person access to our courts for redress of injuries...
that right has never been understood as a limitless warrant
to bring the world's litigation here .... Put another way, if
a potential remedy exists in the alternative forum, then the
'remedy requirement' of article I, section 21 [of the Florida
Constitution] actually is being honored.9"
But this is a false dilemma, since only cases with minimum
contacts to the United States would be eligible to be tried in the
United States, and only if subject matter and personal jurisdiction
requirements are satisfied.91 These requirements should enor-
mously reduce the fears expressed in Kinney, where the Florida
Supreme Court expressed its concerns that Florida courts would
be overloaded with suits brought by foreign plaintiffs.92
I. Conditional Dismissals Under Forum Non
Conveniens
In order to ameliorate the devastating effects that FNC dis-
missals have caused on, among others, Latin American plaintiffs,
U.S. courts have contrived the mechanism of conditional FNC dis-
missals. These conditional dismissals include the "waiver of defen-
dant's statute of limitations defense, admissions of liability, and/
or retention of jurisdiction under the proper control of the dis-
missing court."93 Another condition has been that "the defendant
consent to liberal, U.S.-style discovery."94 Of all these conditions,
the requirement that the foreign forum retain jurisdiction over the
90. Marlowe, supra note 50, at 307 n.54 (quoting Kinney Sys., Inc. v. Cont'l Ins.
Co., 674 So.2d 86, 92-93 (Fla. 1996)).
91. See Stewart, supra note 37, at 1265 ("In order to comport with due process,
assertion of personal jurisdiction over a defendant demands a certain relationship
between the defendant, the litigation, and the forum. According to the Supreme
Court, if there are minimum contacts between a defendant and the forum such that
the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice, jurisdiction may properly be asserted . . . and there must be
evidence of some intent on the part of the defendant to avail himself of the privilege of
conducting activities in the forum, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its
laws.") (citations omitted).
92. See Marlowe, supra note 50, at 302 (explaining that the Kinney court "made
much of the costs related to adjudicating disputes with origins on foreign soil, and
cautioned of the deleterious economic effects some foreign-related cases have upon
Florida taxpayers").
93. Id. at 303 n.30.
94. Carney, supra note 27, at 483 (citing Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235,
257 n.25 (1981)).
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case is the one generating most controversies over FNC. 95
Several commentators have adopted a rather naive approach
to conditional FNC dismissals, arguing that "by no means is it the
purpose of the U.S. court to obligate a foreign plaintiff to file its
claim overseas, or to force the foreign court to hear the case." s But
the facts show otherwise, as Latin American plaintiffs are forced
to re-file their claims in their home jurisdictions.97 On the other
hand, since the FNC defense is legally available for a U.S. defen-
dant, it would be highly unusual for her not to raise it in cases
where the FNC defense could apply.9s
J. Appellate Standard of Review for Forum Non
Conveniens Dismissals
The standard for an appellate court to set aside a FNC dis-
missal by a district court is that of abuse of discretion in granting
the FNC dismissal.9 Abuse of discretion occurs when a decision:
"(1) rests either on an error of law or on a clearly erroneous find-
ing of fact, or (2) cannot be located within the range of permissible
decisions, or (3) fails to consider all the relevant factors or unrea-
sonably balances those factors.""' As previously noted, this stan-
95. See, e.g., Winston Anderson, Forum Non Conveniens Checkmated?- The
Emergence of Retaliatory Legislation, 10 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 183, 198 (2001)
("To be fair, in both Delgado and Recherches, the foreign forum, before dismissing,
sought to ensure that trial could take place in the local forum. In Delgado, Justice
Lake made his dismissal of the plaintiffs' action conditional 'upon acceptance of
jurisdiction by the foreign courts involved in these cases.' In the event that the
highest court of any foreign country finally affirmed the dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction, the action could be returned to the United States for resumption 'as if the
case had never been dismissed.'" (quoting Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., 890 F. Supp. 1324,
1375 (S.D. Tex. 1995))); see also Carney, supra note 27, at 483 n.409 (listing instances
in which courts dismissed for forum non conveniens on condition defendant submit to
jurisdiction in foreign forum).
96. See, e.g., Oxman, supra note 40, at 124 ("A provisional or conditional dismissal
does not force a plaintiff or a foreign court to do anything; it simply indicates that the
forum may reconsider the dismissal under certain conditions.").
97. Dahl, supra note 41, at 24 ("The laws of Ecuador, Guatemala and
PARLATINO take the view that FNC forces the plaintiff to re-file the case and that
such filing is not the product of the plaintiffs free and spontaneous will .... ); id. at
30 ("The US court orders the plaintiff to re-file the lawsuit abroad.").
98. It has been argued that if the U.S. defendant's counsel fails to file a motion to
dismiss on FNC, she could be accused of professional malpractice. Reed, supra note 7,
at 67. Also, "[it is part of a lawyer's job to bring suit in the forum that is best for the
client's interests." Russell J. Weintraub, Introduction to Symposium on International
Forum Shopping, 37 TEX. INT'L L.J. 463, 463 (2002).
99. Peregrine Myanmar Ltd. v. Segal, 89 F.3d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 1996).
100. Pollux Holding Ltd. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 329 F.3d 64, 70 (2d Cir. 2003),
quoted by Fellas, supra note 10, at 292 (citations omitted).
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dard for appellate review reinforces the broad discretion that
district courts enjoy when deciding FNC defenses, thus increasing
the degree of unpredictability of the FNC doctrine.
IV. ADEQUACY AND AVAILABILITY OF THE LATIN
AMERICAN FORUM
A forum is not adequate or inadequate per se. Rather, this
determination depends on the eye of the beholder, so to speak.
Numerous U.S. courts have found Latin American fora adequate
and available when conducting FNC analyses, but in other
instances they have determined that Latin American fora are
inadequate to try disputes in which a U.S. citizen is a party.10 1
"[A] n alternative forum is available if the defendant is 'amenable
to process' in the other forum."0 2 "Even though a defendant may
not have any contacts with the alternative forum, amenability to
process is typically held to be satisfied where the defendant con-
sents to jurisdiction in the alternative forum.""0 3
U.S. courts have conducted an extensive review of the factors
that determine whether the Latin American forum is adequate
and therefore available for purposes of FNC analyses. The many
differences between the U.S. and the Latin American fora show
that the Latin American forum should be judged inadequate, and
thus not available to the U.S. party. 04 But, as stated above, courts
have come to the opposite conclusion in numerous FNC analyses,
where, in each, the Latin American forum has been found to be
available for U.S. defendants and thus declared 'conveniens.'105
The following sub-headings detail the main elements of Latin
American fora that U.S. courts have taken into consideration
when deciding FNC defenses.
A. Pre-Trial Discovery
Pre-trial discovery proceedings do not generally exist in Latin
America as they are known in the United States. Instead, all evi-
101. Although FNC "requires that an adequate alternative forum exist, [it] does not
require that it be an identical forum." Russell, supra note 28, at 360-361.
102. Kearse, supra note 27, at 1309 (citing Piper Aircraft v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235,
255 n.27 (1981) (quoting Gulf Oil Corp v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947))).
103. Dunham & Gladbach, supra note 5, at 678.
104. See Dahl, supra note 41, at 36-37 (citing Martinez v. Dow Chem. Co., 219 F.
Supp. 2d 719 (E.D. La. 2002) (deciding that the Costa Rican and Honduran legal
systems were unavailable)).
105. Wilmore, supra note 38, at 303.
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dence is produced before a judge or a court clerk."0 6 Despite the
relevance of this factor for purposes of FNC reviews, U.S. courts
have held that "[an alternative forum is thus not rendered inade-
quate because it has less extensive discovery procedures than
American courts . ".'. . "I Therefore, the lack of pre-trial discovery
in Latin American countries has not been held to be a determina-
tive factor when deciding whether Latin American fora are ade-
quate for U.S. defendants.
B. Witness Testimony
The differences between the Anglo-American and the Latin
American systems can be most markedly appreciated in the area
of testimonial evidence. The main differences with respect to this
means of evidence between the United States and Latin America
is that, generally, in Latin America: (1) either no opportunity for
deposition of witnesses exists 18 or, if it does exist, the witnesses
must be deposed by the judge;0 9 (2) only live testimony is allowed,
and broadcast testimony or testimony provided by other similar
means is not permitted;1 0 (3) there is a limited number of wit-
nesses that a party may present;' (4) parties to the litigation are
often not allowed to testify as witnesses under the assumption
that their testimony is commonly disregarded by courts as logi-
cally biased and thus unable to generate conviction on a court;
112
(5) certain persons such as a party's spouse, close family member,
employee, co-worker, supervisor, and other people that, according
to U.S. evidentiary standards, might be considered key for a case,
106. Rodgers, supra note 61, at 205.
107. Id. at 207.
108. Dahl, supra note 41, at 38.
109. Sergio Bermudes, Administration of Civil Justice in Brazil, in CIVIL JUSTICE IN
CRISIS: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 349 (Adrian A.S. Zuckerman
ed., 1999) ("[In Brazil,] [alt the hearing, the judge will take the depositions of the
parties[ and] witnesses . . . ."); see also JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW
TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN
AMERICA (2d ed. 1985) [hereinafter MERRYMAN II, reprinted in JOHN HENRY
MERRYMAN, ET AL., THE CIVIL LAw TRADITION: EUROPE, LATIN AMERICA, AND EAST
ASIA, 1013-1022, at 1016 (1994) [hereinafter MERRYMAN II] ("[I]n most civil law
nations, questions are put to witnesses by the judge rather than by counsel for the
parties.").
110. Dahl, supra note 41, at 38.
111. Id.
112. Id.; see, e.g., Joao Clestimo Correa da Costa, Brazil, in Pre-Trial and Pre-
Hearing Procedures Worldwide 260, 265 (Charles Platto ed., 1990) ("The following
cannot be admitted as witnesses: ... (d) anyone involved in the litigation, as well as
ascendants, descendants or collaterals up to the third degree of any of the parties, by
consanguinity or affinity .... "(quoting COD. PRO. Civ., art. 142. (Braz.))).
144
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are often excluded as witnesses based on the fact that they are not
"characterized by ... disinterest in the outcome of the matter;"113
(6) in general, no right to cross-examination exists - questions are
proposed to the judge by the parties' attorneys, and then the judge
poses the question to the witness; and (7) with a few exceptions,
witness protection systems are nonexistent in Latin American tort
litigation.' Case law on FNC has stated that a court's focus
should rest on "the materiality and importance of the anticipated
evidence and testimony and then determine their accessibility and
convenience to the forum," rather than on "the number of wit-
nesses or quantity of evidence in each locale."1 16 Again, courts have
found that differences in testimonial evidence between Latin
American and U.S. fora are not obstacles for FNC dismissals.
C. Expert Testimony
Latin American courts greatly limit parties' use of expert tes-
timony.1 7 In many Latin American jurisdictions, only the court
may appoint expert witnesses.' If they are allowed, the number
of expert witnesses permitted to testify is often limited, such as in
113. ALBERT S. GOLBERT & YENNY NUN, LATIN AMERICAN LAWS AND INSTITUTIONS
27 (1982); see also Dahl, supra note 41, at 38; see, e.g., Correa da Costa, supra note
112, at 265 ("The following cannot be admitted as witnesses: (a) madmen of any sort;
(b) the blind and the deaf, when the subject of their evidence depends upon the
missing senses; (c) minors under 16 years old; . . . (e) spouses." (quoting COD. PRO.
CIv., art. 142. (Braz.))).
114. See MERRYMAN I, supra note 109, at 1016. The right of the parties to pose
questions to the witnesses through the court should not be confused with the right of
the opposing party to call the other party to answer a written interrogatory. In fact,
pursuant to most Latin American codes of civil procedure such procedural tools could
constitute evidence when the party called to answer the interrogatory fails to appear.
In this case, those questions asked in the affirmative are deemed to be admitted by
the party being examined.
115. See Louise Shelley, Keynote Address: Symposium on Prosecuting
Transnational Crimes: Cross-Cultural Insights for the Former Soviet Union, 27
SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 1, 55 (2000).
116. Rodgers, supra note 61, at 211 (quoting Gates Learjet v. Jensen, 743 F.2d
1325, 1335-36 (9th Cir. 1984)).
117. Dahl, supra note 41, at 38-39; see also MERRYMAN I, supra note 109, at 1021
("The power to compel the production of documents, business records, and other
evidence . . . is much weaker [in civil law jurisdictions] than it is in common law
jurisdictions. Judicial remedies in civil proceedings are restricted almost entirely to
remedies that can be enforced against the property of the defendant ... or acts that
can be performed by a third person and charged to the defendant .... In the civil law,
a person who disobeys a lawful order of the court in a civil action may thus be liable to
a party for damages..., but he cannot be punished by the judge. The most the judge
can do is ask that he be criminally prosecuted. By contrast, the common law judge in a
civil proceeding can punish for contempt.").
118. Dahl, supra note 41, at 39.
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the case of Argentina.'19 These differences in the availability of
expert testimony in tort cases do not seem to have influenced the
decisions of U.S. courts when deciding FNC defenses.
D. Documentary Evidence
Latin American courts are very limited in their ability to
issue orders mandating the production of documents related to a
matter.2 ' Parties' requests for document production must pre-
cisely describe the documents to be produced by the parties. 2' In
addition, if a party denies having a document, there are no means
to compel that party to produce such document, or to sanction the
party for not producing the document, even if there are reasonable
grounds to believe that such documents exists and is in that
party's possession.'22 Again,: the restrictive scope of the parties'
power to obtain documentary evidence has not been a decisive fac-
tor in FNC dismissals.
123
E. Jury trial
In general, jury trials do not exist in Latin America. A few
countries include the right of citizens to jury trials in their laws or
constitutions, but this right generally has not been imple-
mented." Latin American judges resolve both matters of fact and
issues of law in civil disputes.2 5 In addition, there is no "trial" as it
is known in the U.S. legal system. 26 In the Latin American civil




122. See Luz Patricia Toro, Colombia, in PRE-TRIAL AND PRE-HEARING PROCEDURES
WORLDWIDE, supra note 112, at 272, 274 ("Requests for pre-trial procedures with
discovery are not available under the Colombian legal system.").
123. Fellas, supra note 10, at 316 ("While most countries do not have the broad
scope of discovery available in the U.S., this will not render a foreign forum
inadequate.").
124. See, e.g., Robert M. Kossick, Jr., Litigation in the United States and Mexico: A
Comparative Overview, 31 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 23, 41 (2000) ("U.S. counsel
should note that a request for a jury trial is not part of an original petition to a
Mexican court. While Mexican law provides for the use of seven member juries, they
are not used in practice.").
125. See MERRYMAN I, supra note 109;.at 1014.
126. Id. ("What common [law] lawyers think of as a trial in civil proceedings does
not exist in the civil law world."); see also Garro, supra note 8, at 86 ("It is noteworthy
that in Latin America, as in most civil law jurisdictions, there is no such a thing as a
'trial,' in the Anglo-American sense of the word."); Juan G. Lohmann, Peru, in PRE-
TRIAL AND PRE-HEARING PROCEDURES WORLDWIDE, supra note 112, at 275, 276 ("Jury
trials are unknown in Peru.").
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and the evidence in a given case and make their decisions in the
solitude of their chambers.'27 Several commentators are of the
opinion that the nonexistence of juries works as an advantage for
U.S. defendants in Latin America.'28 Regardless of whether or not
this is actually beneficial, however, this factor has not, by itself,
been considered as a deterrent for FNC dismissals by U.S. courts.
F. Third Party Practice
The U.S. procedural tools of joinder, impleader and inter-
pleader do not broadly exist in Latin America. Intervention of
third parties in pending tort suits is very limited.'29 Consolidation
of cases or actions is not common third party practice in Latin
America, as every consolidated action is tried separately and there
is "no more than a physical aggregation of several plaintiffs and
defendants in the same case and before the same court."3 ° U.S.
courts have largely disregarded the Latin American plaintiffs'
broad unavailability to act together in mass tort cases against
U.S. defendants in Latin American fora at the moment of deciding
FNC defenses.'31
G. Substantive Rules on Tort Liability
Latin American tort liability laws differ from their
equivalents in the U.S. in many respects. For example, in Latin
America: (1) rules on indemnity or contribution from a third party
are very restrictive;'32 (2) there are scant rules on strict liability in
127. See MERRYMAN I, supra note 109, at 1014.
128. See, e.g., Dorward, supra note 2, at 147 ("American jurors have very different
backgrounds and economic sympathies compared to those of the professional judges
and career bureaucrats who decide disputes in most foreign courts. Consequently,
these juries are more likely to award judgment to individual plaintiffs suing large
MNCs.").
129. See Marcelo E. Bombau, Argentina, in PRE-TRiAL AND PRE-HEARING
PROCEDURES WORLDWIDE, supra note 112, at 245, 252 ("Crossclaims are almost totally
unknown in Argentine legal practice and they have not won special treatment from
local procedural codes.").
130. Garro, supra note 8, at 88.
131. See, e.g., Standard Fruit Co. v. Martinez, No. 02-30380, 2002 WL 32513510, at
*14-15 (5th Cir. Oct. 2, 2002) ("By ignoring well-reasoned opinions addressing facts
virtually identical to those in this case and by erroneously interpreting foreign law,
the trial court's opinion invites foreign plaintiffs to unilaterally decide that the United
States is the only proper forum for their cases by the simple act of first filing suit in
the United States, rather than in their homelands. As a result, the trial court's
opinion can be used by those who wish to nullify the doctrine of forum non conveniens,
has a negative impact on American forum non conveniens jurisprudence and creates a
heavy administrative burden on the United States' legal system.").
132. See generally Dahl, supra note 41, app. at 47-58.
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product liability cases, where fault-based liability is the general
rule;133 (3) the lack of stare decisis in Latin America limits a uni-
form construction of statutes concerning civil tort liability; 3 4 (4)
Latin American courts generally award low amounts for compen-
satory damages; 3 ' (5) no punitive damages exist in Latin
America; 36 (6) many Latin American countries "cap tort awards,
which furthers limits plaintiff's recovery;"'37 and (7) the concept of
non-monetary damages has not been interpreted as broadly as in
the United States.' Nevertheless, U.S. courts have held that sub-
stantive legal differences between the United States and a foreign
country do not constitute a ground for FNC dismissals. 39
H. Litigation Costs
Latin American legal systems often impose litigation taxes
upon plaintiffs as a pre-condition for filing complaints. 4 ° This pro-
cedural limitation has a high potential to become a discriminatory
hurdle for low income-plaintiffs, but U.S. courts have not
addressed this issue in FNC analyses.
I. Contingent Fee Agreements
There is a general distrust of contingent fee agreements in
Latin America, as in most civil law jurisdictions, where they are
generally considered morally reproachable1 4' (although this situa-
133. This is due to the fact that civil codes were first introduced in the early 19th
century in Latin America, long before the development of product liability theories.
See, e.g., Wiesner, supra note 21, at 454 n.138 ("In 1855, Venezuelan statesman
Andres Bello drafted the Chilean Civil Code, the first Latin American code to grant
aliens and national civil equality." (quoting Edwin Borchard, The "Minimum
Standard" of the Treatment of Aliens, 38 MICH. L. REv. 445, 450 (1940))).
134. See Thomas J. Moyer, Mediation as a Catalyst for Judicial Reform in Latin
America, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 619, 648 (2003).
135. See Philip A. Robbins, Feature: Borderlands: What Lawyers Need to Know
About Product Liability Law in Latin America, 38 ARIZ. ATr'Y 36, 38 (2002). By
contrast, for example, "[Tiexas juries are famous for their large jury awards."
Albright, supra note 2, at 354.
136. See Robbins, supra note 135, at 36, 38.
137. Duval-Major, supra note 33, at 671.
138. For example, the concepts of "mental distress," "mental anguish," "emotional
distress," "loss of society," and "loss of consortium" are rarely used by Latin American
courts as grounds to award non-monetary damages. Id.
139. On the need to apply foreign law, the Piper Court held that "this factor alone is
not sufficient to warrant dismissal ... "Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235,
260 n. 29 (1981).
140. For example, Argentinean Law requires a tax of 3% of the amount claimed in
civil suits to be paid. Dahl, supra note 41, at 41 n.85.
141. See MERRYMAN II, supra note 109, at 1026.
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tion has been changing in recent years). In many cases, they have
been held unenforceable.'42 Nevertheless, this factor has not
caused U.S. courts to reject U.S. defendants' FNC defenses.
J. Judicial Workloads and Unreasonable Delays
Judicial backlogs are a huge problem in Latin America often
amounting to judicial denial.143 U.S. courts, however, have not con-
sidered these probable substantial delays or eventual claim deni-
als as constituting a ground for FNC dismissals.
K. Political Issues14
U.S. courts should consider certain political issues when mak-
ing a FNC determination. A number of these considerations are:
(1) the alleged corruption of Latin American fora;"' (2) the lack of
impartiality and independence of Latin American courts;146 (3) the
devaluation of monetary awards denominated in Latin American
currencies between the time of the award and the time of effective




L. Other Practical Issues
Tort litigation in Latin America is yet limited by other factors,
including: (1) lack of judicial training and expertise in highly com-
plicated legal issues such as product liability and environmental
torts;"'49 (2) deficient working facilities and understaffed courts;5 '
142. See id.; Robbins, supra note 135, at 36. An exception to this general rule is
sometimes present in cases involving indigent clients, such as in Costa Rica. Garro,
supra note 8, at 89.
143. See Dahl, supra note 41, at 41-42.
144. The State Department issues reports on the political situation of other
countries, and these reports are given weight by U.S. courts at the time of
determining whether the alternative forum is available. Marlowe, supra note 50, at
296-97, 303.
145. See Jon Mills, Panel IV. Comparative Constitutional Approaches to the Rule of
Law and Judicial Independence Principles for Constitutions and Institutions in
Promoting the Rule of Law, 16 FLA. J. INT'L L. 115, 124 n.22, 125-27 (2004).
146. Id.
147. See generally KEITH S. ROSENN, LAW AND INFLATION 220-34 (1982);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 823
(1986); see, e.g., Claire A. Hill, How Investors React to Political Risk, 8 DUKE J. COMP.
& INT'L L. 283, 292 (1998) ("[In late 1994, Mexico experienced a financial crisis in
which its currency was devaluated by forty percent.").
148. See Hill, supra note 147, at 295.
149. See Garro, supra note 8, at 85.
150. See id. at 86.
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(3) lack of technology, as compared with the United States (includ-
ing the adequacy and availability of telephone systems, fax
machines, internet access, etc.); (4) the parties' lack of economic
resources to obtain evidence (i.e. laboratory tests, field tests, medi-
cal and site inspections, scientific reports, etc.) or pay court
costs; 1' (5) unavailability of high-quality translation services, as
compared with the United States; and (6) Latin American fora are
often unable to obtain evidence that U.S. courts would be able to
obtain, including evidence from third countries with which the
United States has cooperation treaties in judicial and procedural
matters.52
Despite all these substantive and procedural limitations, U.S.
courts have considered Latin American fora adequate for trying
cases where U.S. multinational corporations are defendants in
Latin America and have forced Latin American plaintiffs to bring
their complaints before Latin American judges. In fact, in Kinney,
the Florida Supreme Court referred to many of these obstacles as
"'procedural nuisances' that may affect outcomes but that do not
effectively deprive the plaintiff of any remedy"15' and "demanded
that the private interests of the two parties be 'substantially in
balance' regardless of where the lawsuit is ultimately accepted."
54
V. LATIN AMERICAN FoRA AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF
FORUM NON CONVENIENS DIsMIssALs
A. The Latin American Rule on Jurisdiction
The basis for jurisdiction in Latin America is found in statu-
tory law, most commonly in the codes of civil procedure, or in the
151. See id. at 90-91.
152. See id. at 39-40. However, it is important to note that the United States has
signed Bilateral Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs) with the following Latin
American countries: Argentina (1993), Brazil (2001), Colombia (1980, not in force),
Mexico (1991), Uruguay (1994), and Venezuela (1997, not in force). See U.S. DEPT. OF
STATE, MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE (MLAT) AND OTHER AGREEMENTS, http://travel.
state.gov/law/info/judicialjudicial_690.html (last visited on October 13, 2005) (citing
Allan Ellis & Robert L. Pisani, The United States Treaties on Mutual Assistance in
Criminal Matters: A Comparative Analysis, 19 INT'L L. 189 (1985); James I.K. Knapp,
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties as a Way to Pierce Bank Secrecy, 20 CASE W. RES. L.
REv. 405, 434 (1988); Ethan A. Nadelmann, Negotiations on Criminal Law Assistance
Treaties, 33 AM. J. COMP. L. 467 (1985); MARIAN NASH, CUMULATIVE DIGEST OF
UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 1981-1988 1449, 1488 (Book II
1994)); see also STEINHARDT, supra note 43, at 259 (Lexis Nexis ed., 2002).
153. Kinney Sys., Inc. v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 674 So.2d 86, 91 (Fla. 1996), quoted in
Marlowe, supra note 50, at 300.
154. Marlowe, supra note 50, at 301 (quoting Kinney, 674 So.2d at 91).
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Bustamante Code in those countries where this convention has
been ratified.155
Latin American jurisdictional rules are different from their
equivalent in the United States. Jurisdiction there is a matter of
public policy that cannot be waived by the parties. A court either
has or does not have jurisdiction to hear a case. Once jurisdiction
is established, the court is not allowed to refuse to hear a case on
grounds not permitted by the constitution or legislation. 156 The
rule is that the defendant's place of domicile or business, or where
the injury occurred determines the court's jurisdiction. The choice
of forum belongs to the plaintiff. A plaintiff may choose to sue in a
court not corresponding to the defendant's domicile, but the defen-
dant has the right to petition the transfer of the case to the appro-
priate court (that of her domicile). After the court of the
defendant's domicile has acquired jurisdiction, such jurisdiction
cannot be disturbed by the parties or by the court itself. In other
words, once jurisdiction is lost, it is lost forever. 157 Therefore, Latin
American courts understand that once a plaintiff has decided to
sue a U.S. defendant in the court of the defendant's domicile,
which in this case is the United States, Latin American courts
have lost their right to hear that case, if in fact such a right ever
existed.
5 1
The expected consequence is that Latin American courts have
refused to hear cases re-filed by plaintiffs after FNC dismissals by.
U.S. courts, which take place usually after many years of jurisdic-
tional litigation.'59 It must be reminded that plaintiffs everywhere
seek to have their final judgments enforced against defendants
and be paid from the defendant's property. The problem increases
when two fora are involved, with the risk that the defendant's
forum will not enforce the foreign judgment. It seems that this is
precisely what has happened to Latin American plaintiffs trying
to enforce a decision before a U.S. court, which could be called the
risk of a third dismissal.
155. Argentina, Colombia, Mexico, Paraguay, Uruguay, and the United States have
not ratified the Bustamante Code. See BUSTAMANTE CODE app. III at 141 (Julio
Romafiach, Jr. ed. & trans., Lawrence Publ'g Co. 1996).
156. See Dahl, supra note 41, at 27 ("A Latin American court cannot be expected to
disregard its own law and become complicit in a system that denies the plaintiffs
right to choose the defendant's court.").
157. Id. at 28-29.
158. Id.
159. See id. at 46 ("It follows that with or without blocking statutes, Latin
American nations do not generally offer an alternative jurisdiction in a FNC
situation.").
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The Latin American rationale, however, is not foreign to the
U.S. rules on jurisdiction. In general, U.S. jurisdictional rules
state that once a corporation or entity incorporates in one jurisdic-
tion, the requirement of minimum contacts is satisfied. 160 In turn,
minimum contacts are a basis for jurisdiction. The U.S. corpora-
tion should, therefore, expect to be sued in the jurisdiction of its
incorporation, thus barring the FNC defense. U.S. defendants
have argued that under the same rule, doing business in Latin
America creates minimum contacts that make them amenable to
such fora, enabling Latin American courts to obtain jurisdiction
over them.161 Herein lies the core of the impasse between the
United States and Latin America under the FNC analysis.
Consequently, when U.S. courts have declined to hear com-
plaints brought by Latin American plaintiffs in the forum freely
chosen by them, the overall reaction has been that Latin Ameri-
can courts have rejected the claims on the ground that the Latin
American forum was not freely chosen, and that the U.S. forum
was the proper forum.6 2
B. Consequences of Forum Non Conveniens
Dismissals
FNC dismissals have largely resulted in plaintiffs being una-
ble to obtain any redress in their cases." Indeed, informal surveys
show that claims rejected in the U.S. under FNC have not, in gen-
160. See generally Charles W. "Rocky" Rhodes, The Predictability Principle in
Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine: A Case Study on the Effects of a "Generally" too Broad,
but "Specifically" too Narrow Approach to Minimum Contacts, 57 BAYLOR L. REV. 135
(2005).
161. This view has been affirmed indirectly by repeated holdings of Latin American
courts. For example, the Supreme Court of Panama has held that "[t]he plaintiffs in
this case chose first to file the complaint in the United States, in St. Louis County, St.
Louis, Missouri, where the defendant Multidata Systems International, Inc. has its
main office. All of the defendants are foreign corporations and none of them is
registered in our country, and none of them are doing business in Panama. Thus, the
defendants may not be sued under Article 600 of the Panamanian Judicial Code.
Therefore, this Court of Justice considers and sustains that it does not and cannot
obtain jurisdiction over the defendants in accordance with Article 600, 58 and/or 59 of
the Panamanian Judicial Code." Josefina Escalante Romero v. Multidata Sys. Int'l,
Inc. et al., Court Order No. 1922-03 (1st Ct. J., Civ. Cir., Pan., 2003), translated in
Dahl, supra note 41, at 61.
162. Garro, supra note 8, at 74 ("The reaction of the courts in civil law countries of
Latin America when U.S. courts transfer cases on FNC grounds has not been
favorable.").
163. See Oxman, supra note 40, at 128 ("Needless to say, in any given case in which
the U.S. court dismisses the case anyway, and in which the foreign court refuses to
hear the case, the plaintiff may well be denied any remedy.").
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eral, been tried elsewhere.1" A survey "of more than fifty personal
injury actions dismissed under forum non conveniens doctrine
[showed that] only one case was actually tried in a foreign
court."165 Another survey of one hundred and eighty transnational
cases dismissed from the United States court for forum non con-
veniens showed that "[0]f the returned responses of eighty-five
cases, eighteen cases were not pursued further in the foreign
forum, twenty-two settled for less than half the estimated value,
and in twelve, the United States attorneys had lost track of the
outcome. Most importantly, none of the reported cases proceeded
to a courtroom victory from the foreign forum."1 6 '6 The surveyor
concluded that, "pretending that such dismissals are not outcome-
determinative is a rather fantastic fiction."167
Understandably, criticisms of forum non conveniens have
included "accusations of parochialism, naked and open chauvin-
ism. ..16 and its application has even been labeled as a "crazy
quilt of ad hoc, capricious, and inconsistent decisions. 1169 FNC has
also been called xenophobic.'
C. Responses of Latin American Fora to Forum Non
Conveniens Dismissals
FNC dismissals have caused serious consequences to Latin
American plaintiffs for two reasons. The first is the uncertainty of
whether their claims will be tried by U.S. courts, or if they will
have to waste time waiting for a costly dismissal. And secondly,
after dismissal has occurred, they have no certainty as to whether
the Latin American court will hear their claims. As already
stated, Latin American courts have opted for refusing to hear
cases dismissed under FNC by U.S. courts, or to resend them to
U.S. fora instead. Latin American dismissals have taken two
164. Marlowe, supra note 50, at 320 n.7 (citing Himly Ismail, Forum Non
Conveniens, United States Multinational Corporations, and Personal Injuries in the
Third World: Your Place or Mine?, 11 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 249, 250 n.7 (1991)).
165. Id.
166. Duval-Major, supra note 33, at 672.
167. Lauderdale, supra note 40, at 142.
168. Reed, supra note 7, at 40.
169. Id. at 43.
170. Dahl, supra note 41, at 28 n.35 (citations omitted).
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forms: judicial retaliation 171 and blocking statutes. 17 2
1. Judicial Retaliation: Refusal of Remands
One commentator lists the adverse effects that U.S. FNC dis-
missals cause in Latin America, including: 7 ' (1) it forces plaintiffs
to involuntarily file a claim, thus violating procedural freedom; (2)
it violates the plaintiffs right to choose the forum corresponding
to the defendant's domicile, pursuant to applicable legislation
(such as codes of civil procedure and Article 323 of the Busta-
mante Code); 74 (3) it violates the principle of pre-emptive jurisdic-
tion, according to which once a court acquires jurisdiction to hear
a case, all other courts cease to have jurisdiction to hear the same
case; (4) it has litis pendentia implications - it would happen when
an appeal against a FNC dismissal in the United States is pend-
ing and the plaintiff re-files its complaint in a Latin American
court; (5) conditions or stipulations, most commonly an involun-
tary waiver of statute of limitations, forced on the plaintiff by a
U.S. court amounts to a violation of the plaintiffs legal rights in
the Latin American jurisdiction;' (6) issues of sovereignty are
involved when a country's court imposes its decision over the
other country's; (7) the lack of jurisdiction of Latin American
courts to reach assets of the defendant in the United States is also
at stake; and (8) there are more procedural means to obtain evi-
dence in the U.S.
76
One example of a judicial retaliatory dismissal is the decision
in the case of Abarca v. Shell Oil Co.,177 which was heard by the
Fourth Civil Court of San Jos6 in Costa Rica. The Abarca decision,
171. See Sarno, supra note 2, at 397-98 ("Likewise, broad assertions over foreign
nationals whose sovereigns maintain retaliatory jurisdiction statutes directly impact
future litigation by U.S. defendants in those fora by increasing the chances of
retaliatory jurisdiction.").
172. See generally Dahl, supra note 41.
173. See id. at 25-35.
174. Article 323 of the Bustamante Code provides that in personal suits "the
competent judge shall be a judge of the place where the obligation is to be performed
or the place of the defendant's domicile, and secondarily, the place of the latter's
residence." Bustamante Code, art. 323, translated in BusTAMANTE CODE, supra note
155, at 43.
175. See, e.g., BCCI v. Bank of Pakistan, 273 F.3d 241, 246 (2d Cir. 2001), quoted in
Fellas, supra note 10, at 307 ("[Aln adequate forum does not exist if a statute of
limitations bars the bringing of a case in that forum.").
176. See, e.g., Fellas, supra note 10, at 6 (stating that the "availability of broader
discovery" is an advantage of U.S. fora).




written by Judge Gonzdlez, was a direct response to the Delgado
v. Shell Co.'78 decision, which had been issued a year earlier by a
federal court in Texas. In the Delgado case, the Costa Rican plain-
tiffs (as well as plaintiffs from other countries) argued that expo-
sure to the nematocide dibromochloropropane, which was
allegedly manufactured by companies United States caused them
injuries. 7 9 However, the Delgado court dismissed the plaintiffs'
lawsuits, invoking the FNC doctrine.' ° Pursuant to the Delgado
decision, the plaintiffs later resubmitted their claims in Costa
Rica. The decision in Abarca, which was eventually confirmed by
the Costa Rican Supreme Court in 1996,181 rejected the application
of the FNC doctrine by the Delgado court and dismissed the plain-
tiffs' claims.'
In Abarca, Judge Gonzdlez declared that the FNC doctrine is
an institution that is "neither recognized nor applicable in our
legal system, and therefore cannot be used as the legal ground for
determining the jurisdiction of this Court."8 3 The court went on to
sustain:
[A]rticle 323 of the Bustamante Code provides that, aside
from cases of express or tacit submission, or any provisions
of local law to the contrary, the court with jurisdiction to
try in personam actions is that of the place where the obli-
gation is to be performed or that of the defendant's domicile
and, in default, that of the defendant's residence.
8
1
Based on that provision, the court reasoned that "the plaintiffs
acted according to law when they filed their lawsuits in the Courts
of the State of Texas [which was] the domicile or residence of the
companies sued."85 Judge Gonzalez concluded:
[N]ow Judge Lake'86 could reassume the case via "return",
as he indicated in his own memorandum. The fact that the
other authority considers it more convenient for the plain-
tiffs to try their case in another forum, even against their
express will, is irrelevant information for the case at bar,
178. Delgado v. Shell Co., 890 F. Supp. 1324 (S.D. Tex. 1995), affd, 231 F.3d 165
(5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 972 (2001).
179. Delgado, 890 F. Supp. at 1335-36.
180. Id. at 1373.
181. Abarca v. Shell Oil Co., Resoluci6n No. 010-A-96.CIV, 15:15, 21 de Febrero de
1996 (Costa Rica).
182. Abarca, Expediente No. 1011-95 at 9-10.
183. Id. at 5, lines 15-18 (translation by author).
184. Id. at 7, lines 8-13 (translation by author).
185. Id. at 8, lines 22-25 (translation by author).
186. Judge Lake was the Texas judge who issued the Delgado decision.
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because, as Doctor Arguedas Salazar points out, "Jurisdic-
tion is a fruit of sovereignty, therefore it cannot be exported
or subjected to sacrifice."'
2. Legislative Retaliation: Anti-Forum Non Conveniens or
Blocking Statutes
18
In the wake of U.S. FNC dismissals, Latin American coun-
tries have also passed retaliatory legislation to tackle the negative
effects that these dismissals have caused to Latin American plain-
tiffs. 189 These statutes generally apply in product injury cases
brought by Latin American plaintiffs against U.S. defendants in
U.S. courts for torts arising out of the defendants' activities in
Latin America. 9 ° Therefore, blocking statutes do not apply to suits
between Latin American nationals, or to suits brought by a Latin
American plaintiff against another Latin American in the United
States.
In general, blocking statutes provide that a claim filed in a
foreign country (the United States) extinguishes the jurisdiction of
Latin American courts, which can only be reborn if the Latin
American plaintiff freely files a new claim in the Latin American
forum. Some of these statutes impose on foreign (U.S.) defendants
strict liability in product injury liability cases. Also, some of these
laws establish that the determination of the amount of compensa-
tory damages must be made according to the same standards used
by courts in the United States, and mandate the posting of a bond
after foreign plaintiffs have been served with process. Since block-
ing statutes have not had an arm-twisting effect on U.S. courts,19'
it seems as though they have only contributed to aggravate the
current FNC impasse.
The following are some examples of Latin American blocking
statutes.'92
a. Costa Rica
In 1997, the Costa Rican legislature declined to pass a propo-
sal regarding its Law of Defense of Procedural Rights of Citizens
and Residents. 9' This proposal dealt with cases of concurrent
187. Abarca, Expediente No. 1011-95 at 9, lines 12-19 (translation by author).
188. See generally Anderson, supra note 95; Dahl, supra note 41.
189. See Fellas, supra note 10, at 309.
190. See generally Dahl, supra note 41, app.
191. See id. at 45.
192. See generally id. app.; see also Garro, supra note 8, at 78-81.
193. Expediente No. 12.655, Ley de Defensa de los Derechos Procesales de
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international jurisdiction, when "a claim filed abroad by national
plaintiffs .. .is dismissed because the foreign judge declines his
jurisdiction."194 The proposal established that a "personal action,
filed by a national plaintiff before a foreign court with jurisdiction
extinguishes the jurisdiction" of the Costa Rican court."'95 Accord-
ing to the proposal, this jurisdiction "may be restored if there is a
filing in the country, in a spontaneous and absolutely free way on
the part of said national plaintiff, in which the plaintiff expressly
states his desire to subject himself to the country's jurisdiction."'96
b. Guatemala
The 1997 Law of Defense of Procedural Rights of Nationals
and Residents of Guatemala declares FNC "unacceptable and
invalid" because it violates the plaintiffs free will to choose a
forum.'97 It further establishes that an action dismissed in the
United States under FNC can be reinstated in Guatemala only if
freely filed by the plaintiff.98 Otherwise, Guatemalan courts lack
jurisdiction. The Guatemalan Constitutional Court declared an
earlier provision, which required that the defendant post a bond
before filing its answer, unconstitutional.'99
c. Dominica
The Transnational Causes of Action (Product Liability) Act of
Dominica 20 was passed in 1998 (although it was presented in
1997).211 It requires "the posting of a bond equivalent to 140% 'of
the amount proved by plaintiff to have been awarded in similar
foreign proceedings."'2 °2 The Act imposes strict liability for foreign
Nacionales y Residentes [Costa Rican Proposal for the Law of Defense of Procedural
Rights of Citizens and Residents], Asamblea Legislativa de Costa Rica (Costa Rica
1997). See Garro, supra note 8, at 81.
194. Dahl, supra note 41, app. at 58.
195. Costa Rican Proposal for the Law of Defense of Procedural Rights of Citizens
and Residents art. 47, translated in Dahl, supra note 41, app. at 58-59.
196. Id.
197. Decreto 34-97, Ley de Defensa de Derechos Procesales de Nacionales y
Residentes [Guatemalan Law of Defense of Procedural Rights of Nationals and
Residents], art. 1, (Guat. 1997), translated in Dahl, supra note 41, app. at 48.
198. Id. art. 2.
199. See Dahl, supra note 41, at 23.
200. Decreto 16-97, Ley de las Causas Transnacionales de la Acci6n
(Responsabilidad por Productos) [Transnational Causes of Action (Product Liability)
Act of Dominica], (Dominica 1997), translated in Dahl, supra note 41, app. at 49-50.
201. Anderson, supra note 95, at 187.
202. Dahl, supra note 41, at 24 (quoting Transnational Causes of Action (Product
Liability) Act of Dominica, § 5).
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defendants in product injury liability cases,2 °3 allowing courts to
award punitive damages and to force other forms of redress upon
defendants.2 4 The Act also determines that the amount of com-
pensatory damages must be determined by the same standards
used by courts in the United States.2 5 Finally, this legislation had
retroactive effect on all actions pending at the date of its entering
into force.20 6
d. Ecuador
Also in 1998, Ecuador passed the Interpretive Law of Articles
27, 28, 29 and 30 of the Code of Civil Procedure for Cases of Inter-
national Concurrent Jurisdiction.2 7 The law provides that after a
suit was filed in a foreign country, Ecuadorian courts permanently
lose competence and jurisdiction to hear the same case.20 8 This law




The Special Law to Process Lawsuits Filed by People Affected
by the Use of Pesticides Manufactured with DBCP was passed in
2000 (although it was published in 2001).210 Pursuant to this law,
"[e]nterprises sued in the United States of America which have
opted to have the lawsuits transferred to Nicaraguan courts and
203. Transnational Causes of Action (Product Liability) Act of Dominica, § 8,
translated in Dahl, supra note 41, app. at 49; see also Anderson, supra note 95, at 208.
204. Transnational Causes of Action (Product Liability) Act of Dominica, § 10(2),
translated in Dahl, supra note 41, app. at 49 (stating that requests for an apology,
publication of facts regarding defendant's products, advertising of warnings regarding
defendant's products, and publication of adverse consequences of the defendant's
wrongful acts are alternative forms of redress); see also Anderson, supra note 95, at
210.
205. Transnational Causes of Action (Product Liability) Act of Dominica, § 12(1),
translated in Dahl, supra note 41, app. at 50.
206. Id. § 15.
207. Ley 55, Ley Interpretativa de Los Articulos 27, 28, 29 y 30 del C6digo de
Procedimiento Civil para los Casos de Competencia Concurrente Internacional [Law
Interpreting Articles 27, 28, 29 and 30 of the Code of Civil Procedure Providing for
Concurrent International Jurisdiction], 247 R.O. Supp., 30 de Enero de 1998 (Ecuador
1998), translated in Dahl, supra note 41, app. at 48.
208. Id. art. 1.
209. Fellas, supra note 10, at 311-12.
210. Ley 364, Ley Especial Para la Tramitaci6n de Juicios Promovidos Por Las
Personas Afectadas Por el Uso de Pesticidas Fabricados a Base de DBCP [Special Law
to Process Lawsuits Filed by People Affected by the Use of Pesticides Manufactured
with DBCP], LA GAc. 12, 17 de Enero de 2001 (Nicar. 2001), translated in Dahl, supra
note 41, app. at 50-53; see also Garro, supra note 8, at 80-81.
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are presently being sued before our national courts, once that the
scope of the claim has been demonstrated in the respective judicial
proceeding, shall be bound to indemnify .... In addition, for-
eign defendants are forced to post a bond for two reasons: (1) to
pay for the plaintiffs' litigation costs; and (2) to guarantee the pay-
ment of a final judgment.212
VI. POSSIBLE WAYS TO RESOLVE THE FORUM NON
CONVENIENS IMPASSE
A. Taking a Multilateral Approach to Forum Non
Conveniens
Possibly the best mechanism for solving the FNC impasse
would be an international treaty between the United States and
Latin American countries. In October of 1999, a Special Commis-
sion of the Hague Conference of Private International Law
adopted the Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and
Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters ("Hague Pre-
liminary Draft")." 3 This preliminary draft deals in large part with
the issue of FNC. The Hague Preliminary Draft corroborates the
civil law rule of the defendant's domicile." 4 In addition, it gives
the concept of domicile a broad meaning by, besides including the
habitual residence, mentioning the place of statutory seat, incor-
poration or formation, central administration, or principal place of
211. Special Law to Process Lawsuits Filed by People Affected by the Use of
Pesticides Manufactured with DBCP, art. 3, translated in Dahl, supra note 41, app. at
51.
212. Id. arts. 4, 5.
213. Hague Convention on Private International Law, Preliminary Draft
Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters,
Prel. Doc. No. 11 (Aug. 2000) [hereinafter Hague Preliminary Draft], available at
http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/jdgmpdll.pdf. For a Latin American-based
commentary on the Hague Preliminary Draft, see Inter-American Juridical
Committee of the Organization of American States [IAJCOAS], Doc. No. CJI/doc.2/00,
Proposal for an Inter-American Convention on the Effects and Treatment of the Forum
Non Conveniens Theory: Forum Non Conveniens and the Hague Convention. Latin
American Position (2000) [hereinafter IAJCOAS Forum Non Conveniens Proposal], in
IAJCOAS, Annual Report of the Inter-American Juridical Committee, OEA/Ser.Q/
VI.31, 68-85 (Aug. 25, 2000), available at http://www.oas.orgcji/eng/infoanual.cji.
2000.ing.pdf.
214. See COD. PRoc. Civ. art. 48 (Chile 2000); C6D. ORG. TRIBUN. art. 134 ("In
general, the court with jurisdiction to hear a civil lawsuit or to intervene in a non-
contentious action is that of the defendant or the interested party.") (translation by
author); Bustamante Code arts. 22-26, 330, translated in BUSTAMANTE CODE, supra
note 155, at 4, 43.
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business.215 The Hague Preliminary Draft recognizes the plaintiffs
right to choose between suing in the courts of the defendant's dom-
icile, or of the tort occurrence.216 Only under exceptional circum-
stances may a court with proper jurisdiction decline to hear a
case, for example, "if a court of another State has jurisdiction and
is clearly more appropriate to resolve the dispute."2 1 7 However, the
Hague Preliminary Draft leaves numerous fundamental questions
still unanswered. For example, by its terms, the draft would allow
a Latin American court with proper jurisdiction to decline a case
"if a court of another State has jurisdiction and is clearly more
appropriate to resolve the dispute."2 8 It seems as though this pro-
vision effectively leaves room for U.S. courts to support FNC
dismissals.1 9
There is, however, a somewhat more promising treaty propo-
sal (or, at least, a more informative proposal). The Inter-American
Juridical Committee, in 2000, presented to the General Assembly
of the Organization of American States its Proposal for an Inter-
American Convention on the Effects and Treatment of the "Forum
Non Conveniens" Theory: "Forum Non Conveniens" and the Hague
Convention. Latin American Position ("Latin American
Proposal").22 °
This Latin American Proposal is the result of the strong oppo-
sition that FNC has caused in Latin America.221 In addition, the
proposal illustrates the many differences between the U.S. and
Latin American legal systems, such as in the fields of long-arm
jurisdiction and service of process - concepts that are unknown in
the Latin American legal arena. 2 The Latin American Proposal
reiterates that, in Latin America, the proper court to hear a civil
claim is that of the defendant's domicile. 22 The proposal goes on to
state that Latin American civil jurisdiction can only be acquired
through the plaintiff's free will. 224 Therefore, in the lack of such
free will, no jurisdiction is created, and Latin American courts
215. Hague Preliminary Draft, supra note 213, art. 3.
216. Id. art. 10.
217. Id. art. 22(1).
218. Id.
219. See IAJCOAS Forum Non Conveniens Proposal, supra note 213, at 74-75.
220. Id.
221. See id. at 71 ("There is something Orwellian about exporting FNC. The rule
seems to be: Go and litigate in country X, but if you exercise any right that country X
grants, that I do not like, I will punish you for it.").
222. Id. at 68.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 69 & n.5.
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cannot violate their own law.225 The only scenario for FNC to be
validly applied in Latin America, states the proposal, is when the
suit was not brought before the court of the defendant's domi-
cile 6.22 Finally, the proposal states that FNC is "trumped by inter-
national treaties."227
Among the proposed solutions, the Inter-American Juridical
Committee requires that the U.S. court remanding the case to the
Latin American court:
[S]hall refrain from influencing or from judging the conduct
of the parties before the second court. For instance, it shall
not cause the parties, when they are under the authority of
the second court, to appeal or not to appeal intermediate
decisions, to oppose or not to oppose specific arguments,
etc .... and shall accept any final decision of the second
court, concerning the law of the second country, as conclu-
sive - for instance, a judgment for lack of jurisdiction -
without being able to impose the condition that such deci-
sion should originate from a specific tribunal, like the court
of appeals or the Supreme Court.22 s
Finally, the proposal validates the requirement of the posting
of a bond to U.S. corporate defendants, but expresses the hope
that "a multilateral treaty would solve the serious problems that
FNC causes in an international setting. "229
B. Reformulating Forum Non Conveniens in the
United States
Various proposals have been made in the United States to
deal with problems arising out of FNC dismissals. Some authors
call for U.S. courts to revisit the FNC doctrine, while others advo-
cate an abolition of the FNC doctrine altogether.2 ° However, it
makes sense for a solution to come from Congress by means of
federal legislation. 1 Policy arguments mentioned by scholars,
225. See Daniel C.K. Chow, Limiting Erie in a New Age of International Law:
Toward a Federal Common Law of International Choice-of-Law, 74 IOWA L. REV. 165,
217 (1988) (observing that "domestic choice rules often lead to the application of the
forum's own laws").
226. IAJCOAS Forum Non Conveniens Proposal, supra note 213, at 72.
227. Id. at 69.
228. Id. at 81.
229. Id. at 85.
230. See Lauderdale, supra note 40, at 150.
231. It has been argued that this reform would preferably come in the form of
legislative code adopting selective features of the pragmatic and harmonized scheme
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such as "the interest the community has in resolving the issue,"232
and "the egregiousness of the U.S. corporate defendant's conduct
overseas, "233 support this type of reform of the FNC doctrine. Simi-
lar proposals have been made for reducing problems associated to
U.S. domestic forum-shopping problems.234
At least one scholar's proposal for legislative review of the
FNC doctrine calls for the doctrine's narrow application: FNC dis-
missals should only be allowed when the defendant shows that
"the chosen forum is unnecessarily or unreasonably inconvenient
and that the alternate forum is more convenient."235 The idea
behind such proposals is to make U.S. multinational corporations
amenable to their domestic fora, where they are incorporated, and
where they "developed, manufactured, and tested the product."
236
However, such proposals give no weight to the common difficulties
generated by international litigation, such as the fact that evi-
dence might be located elsewhere. They also overlook legal issues
such as the impossibility for the U.S. defendant to implead a for-
eign party, usually a foreign sovereign.
Despite the good intentions of such proposals, it seems they
would generally fail to properly address the main problem with
the FNC doctrine, which is its lack of consistency in its applica-
tion. Even if federal legislation on FNC existed, it could not cir-
cumvent the U.S. Constitution. In this context, for example, a
state could decide to "make the issue a matter of state constitu-
tional law... [and, in this caseI neither the trial courts, the legis-
lature, nor the United States Supreme Court could affect its
decisions."2 37 This matter is subject to debate, though, because the
U.S. Supreme Court could still achieve the desired uniformity by
invoking the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
Another author suggests getting rid of the "public interests" factor
as the English courts have recently decided, thus only focusing on
of the Brussels Convention on Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments of 1968. See Reed,
supra note 7, at 106-114.
232. Kearse, supra note 27, at 1326.
233. Id.
234. See Whitten, supra note 2, at 561.
235. Kearse, supra note 27, at 1304.
236. Id.
237. Albright, supra note 2, at 394-395.
238. See John Fellas, Lessons on Enforcing Foreign Judgments in the United States,
N.Y.L.J., Sept. 27, 2002, at 4 ("It is not sufficient for a defendant to show that the
particular suit in which the judgment was rendered lacked due process. Rather, it is




the "private interests" element involved in a FNC dispute.23 9
Another commentator has suggested the passage of a model
statute, entitled "A Bill to Preserve Court Access for Injured Per-
sons Seeking Justice in Courts of the United States."240 This com-
prehensive statute would serve as "a vehicle to allow Congress to
overrule Gilbert,241 Reyno,242 and their progeny."243 This bill would
allow FNC dismissals only in cases when the defendant demon-
strates that:
It would be deprived of access to evidence necessary to pre-
serve a substantial right; or [tihe cost of the litigation in
the forum is so disproportionate to the defendant's financial
and physical resources that defendant would be deprived of
the opportunity to be heard; or Itihe forum state has no
legitimate, regulatory interest in the defendant's conduct
that might be advanced by adjudication in the forum; or [i]t
would violate the defendant's rights under an international
treaty ratified by the United States or to which the United
States is a signatory.24
But whatever the solution adopted to tackle the FNC impasse
between the United States and Latin America, it should be a uni-
form solution. Plaintiffs should not be exposed to costly and time-
consuming procedures in their ultimate search for justice.
In the search for new standards, consideration should also be
made of the fact that a U.S. corporation doing business in Latin
America has to run the risk of being sued both overseas and at
home.245  New stricter standards for FNC dismissals should
encourage settlements between the U.S. corporate defendant and
the Latin American plaintiff. Settlements, in the context of pend-
ing or impending litigation, would save costs and time for the par-
ties involved. They would also save U.S. taxpayers money and
ideally encourage a more socially and environmentally friendly
239. Weintraub, supra note 98, at 465.
240. Van Detta, supra note 4, at 68-72.
241. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
242. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
243. Van Detta, supra note 4, at 68 (referring also to Kinney Sys., Inc. v. Cont'l Ins.
Co., 674 So.2d 86 (Fla. 1996)).
244. Id. at 69.
245. See Malcolm J. Rogge, Towards Transnational Corporate Accountability
Challenging the Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, In re: Union Carbide, Alfaro,
Sequihua, and Aguinda, 36 Tax. INT'L L.J. 299, 301 (2001) (stating that, in FNC
dismissals, the transnational corporation benefits from the "best of both worlds,"
gaining ability to reap financial benefits that indirectly result from operating in a
country where citizens are excluded from the political-legal system while insulating
itself from any actions that may be brought against it in home-country courts).
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behavior from U.S. multinational corporations in Latin America.
It is true, nevertheless, that without the threat of effective litiga-
tion, the result of effective and fair settlements cannot be obtained
in this or in any context. If U.S. courts are already making foreign
policy and do not seem to restrain themselves in this venue vis-A-
vis the executive and legislative branches, U.S. courts should,
therefore, follow the contemporary trend of promoting corporate
social responsibility of U.S. multinational corporations.
In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,246 a recent decision concerning
claims of injuries caused abroad by the U.S. government or U.S.
government agents, the U.S. Supreme Court held:
[T]he result of accepting headquarters analysis for foreign
injury cases in which no application of foreign law would
ensue would be a scheme of federal jurisdiction that would
vary from State to State, benefiting or penalizing plaintiffs
accordingly. The idea that Congress would have intended
any such jurisdictional variety is too implausible to drive
the analysis to the point of grafting even a selective head-
quarters exception onto the foreign country exception
itself.247
The Supreme Court, consequently, dismissed claims brought by a
non-U.S. citizen against the U.S. government based on the Fed-
eral Torts Claims Act (FTCA).248 This doctrine, nonetheless, is not
applicable to U.S. multinational corporations.4 9 The FTCA applies
only to federal government liability, and generally does not
address entirely private actions. Ordinarily, however, U.S. mul-
tinational corporations neither are a part of, act on behalf of, nor
purport to represent the U.S. government when conducting busi-
ness overseas. In other words, U.S. multinational corporations are
fully outside of the FTCA, and the recent ruling of the U.S.
246. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
247. Id. at 712; see also David C. Baluarte, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: Upholding the
Alien Tort Claims Act While Affirming American Exceptionalism, 12 No. 1 HUM. RTS.
BRIEF 11, 12 (2004) (stating that the Court held that "Congress intended to bar all
claims arising from an injury suffered in another country"); Steven R. Donziger,
Rainforest Chernobyl: Litigating Indigenous Rights and the Environment in Latin
America, American 11 No. 2 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 1 (2004).
248. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712.
249. In addition, according to the FTCA, the U.S. government may only be sued in
U.S. courts "under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would
be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or
omission occurred." 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). Therefore, the FTCA does not apply to
conduct considered to be entirely governmental in nature. See The 'Lectric Law
Library's Legal Lexicon, Federal Tort Claims Act, http://www.lectlaw.com/def/f071.
htm (last visited on October 13, 2005).
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Supreme Court in the Sosa case does not apply to them.25 °
In this context, a review of the FNC doctrine by U.S. courts
should consider the following proposals.
1. Denying Possibility of Forum Non Conveniens
Dismissal
Denying the possibility of a FNC dismissal if the U.S. defen-
dant is sued in a venue where it is headquartered or incorporated
would certainly solve FNC problems. However, as is the case with
all extreme solutions, this proposal would bring serious injustices
and would probably be rendered ineffective by U.S. courts, which
could be pulled out to the other extreme of dismissing all foreign
suits against U.S. defendants in their home forum.
2. Forcing Latin American Plaintiffs to Prove Minimum
Contacts
Under this idea, mere headquartering or incorporation would
not be sufficient. Proving minimum contacts between the U.S.
defendant and the home forum would need to be satisfied by show-
ing that the defendant designed, manufactured, or distributed a
damaging product in or from the home forum, or that relevant
decisions ultimately causing the injuries were made or overtly tol-
erated by the parent company headquartered or incorporated in
the home forum.
3. Accepting Jurisdiction for Foreign Trade and Product
Liability Cases in Special Circumstances
Accepting jurisdiction for cases dealing with matters that are
relevant to U.S. policies on foreign trade and product liability
seems to be a more realistic approach for an amendment in lieu of
calling for an entire abolition of FNC. The day when U.S. courts
will be totally open to international plaintiffs does not seem to be
near. Therefore, it would be more feasible to adopt this standard.
FNC should be banned in cases that have the potential effect of
unfairly affecting the international competitiveness of U.S. mul-
tinational corporations; or in cases that may adversely impact
trade alliances; or cases where the very behavior of a U.S. corpora-
250. "Although it was a great blow when the Court virtually foreclosed future
litigation against the U.S. government for its activities abroad under the ATCA [Alien
Torts Claims Act], the ability to sue U.S.-based corporations would certainly boost the
statute's legitimacy in the eyes of the international community." Baluarte, supra note
247, at 13.
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tion in Latin America has been called into question as seriously
unethical; or in cases where U.S. consumers could be benefited
directly or indirectly, e.i., in matters related to market access reg-
ulations, product design, communication and transportation
safety, testing of certain products with a potential serious effect
on human, animal or vegetal health or life, among others. In all
these cases, U.S. courts would accept jurisdiction over a case that
otherwise would have been dismissed under current FNC
doctrine.
4. Allowing Courts to Deduct Costs Incurred by
Taxpayers
Yet another possible proposal would be to allow U.S. courts to
assess the costs incurred by U.S. taxpayers and then deduct those
costs from any monetary awards paid to Latin American plain-
tiffs. This proposal addresses a major policy argument that U.S.
courts use to ground FNC dismissals by minimizing the cost of
litigation incurred by U.S. taxpayers.
5. Non-Application of ATCA or FTCA
U.S. courts should not apply recent interpretations of the
Aliens Tort Claims Act or the FTCA made by the U.S. Supreme
Court, such as the Sosa decision, to cases involving U.S. multina-
tional corporations as defendants for torts occurred in Latin
America. The rationale is that these decisions and interpretations
apply only to the U.S. government or to U.S. government agents
for torts occurred overseas. Thus, U.S. courts have the authority
and the leeway to craft different solutions to claims of wrongdo-
ings caused by U.S. multinational corporations in Latin America.
C. Rethinking the Latin American Reaction to the
Forum Non Conveniens Impasse
As detailed earlier in this article, the usual Latin American
response to FNC dismissals has been the rejection of remands. As
a consequence, in most cases, Latin American plaintiffs have seen
their complaints thwarted, and have been left in a situation ofjus-
tice denial.2 51 In this regard, Latin American countries can adopt
several options to deal with the unwanted consequences of FNC
251. For a definition of the concept of "denial of justice" under international law,
see CHIrTHARANJAN F. AMERASINGHE, LocAL REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 31-51
(1990), cited in Wiesner, supra note 21, at 449 n.98.
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dismissals. The following are several examples of such possible
options.
1. Passing Legislation Allowing Courts to Retain
Jurisdiction
One such option Latin American countries have is to pass leg-
islation that would allow their courts to retain jurisdiction over a
case dismissed under FNC in the United States. This could be
accomplished by applying innovative measures. For example, such
legislation could declare evidence gathered in U.S. FNC proceed-
ings admissible, thus circumscribing their decisions to issues of
law (liability, amount of the awards, indemnity, etc.).
2. Allowing Parties to Contractually Waive Forum Non
Conveniens Defense
Another option would be to allow parties to contract to waive
either the FNC defense or the claim that the forum is improper in
any action, suit, or proceeding. The parties might balance such a
waiver by agreeing that a final judgment in any legal action will
be conclusive and may be enforced in other jurisdictions. In any
case, judicial review should be permitted to ensure the fairness of
the waiver.
3. Altering the Burden of Proof
Latin American countries can alter the burden of proof by
having the U.S. defendant prove that it acted with due diligence in
negligence cases, or by limiting strict liability exceptions to the
force majeure or "act of God" defenses.
The flip side of the abovementioned three proposals is that
they could be challenged as unconstitutional under domestic or
international law. It would then be up to Latin American plain-
tiffs to show the hardships and financial burdens they suffered as
a result of the U.S. corporation's harmful conduct.252 Therefore,
252. In a recent case, a New York court included in its opinion an analysis of the
"hardship factor," deciding that, according to New York law, a "dismissal of the action
on forum non conveniens grounds would impose more severe hardship on the plaintiff
than on the defendant." Yakov Pyetranker, Intertec Contracting A/S v. Turner
Steiner International, S.A. 6A.D.3d 1, 774 N.YS.2d 14 (1st Dep't 2004), 18 N.Y. INTL
L. REV. 225, 225 (2005), interpreting Intertec Contracting A/S v. Turner Steiner
International, S.A., 774 N.Y.S.2d 14 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004). In the case, a Danish
corporation sued a Belgian corporation in New York, seeking damages for a project
implemented in Sri Lanka. The court held that "the defendant had failed to
demonstrate that greater hardship would result if the case remained in New York."
2005] 167
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:1
those who have faced the unilateral judicial war declared by U.S.
courts only have Latin American courts as their fair access to jus-
tice.253 Additionally, in the absence of multinational civil courts,
an obstacle to overcome is the enforceability in the United States
of monetary awards issued in overseas proceedings. Unlike
domestic litigation, and also in the absence of multinational civil
courts, there are dead ends to be faced, and this obstacle may very
well lead to one. But despite this difficulty, successful Latin Amer-
ican plaintiffs would be on a more convenient footing than today.
VII. CONCLUSION
As demonstrated, U.S. courts engage in foreign policy through
FNC, having held over and over that U.S. corporations doing busi-
ness in Latin America cannot be held liable in U.S. courts for
actions that occurred in Latin America. U.S. multinational corpo-
rations have shown an unmatched preference for the Latin Ameri-
can fora despite all the general limitations of these fora, as
recognized by extensive case law in the United States. Reforms by
means of federal legislation in the United States would achieve
only limited results. A new statute would bring the same problems
than current FNC because it would be subject to judicial interpre-
tation, and the courts will certainly find new ways to dismiss for-
eign lawsuits to avoid the complications caused by a sudden
docket increase. Therefore, the solution must come from inside of
the courts to be effective. Some of the avenues for coming out of
the current impasse would be for the U.S. courts to decide FNC
disputes on the grounds stated in Part VI of this article.
The best antidote to a country's unilateral action is interna-
tional cooperation. In spite of their obvious benefits, international
treaties between the United States and several Latin American
countries addressing FNC issues could cause a general improve-
ment in the legal and judicial systems of concerned Latin Ameri-
can countries, possibly by means of harmonization of laws and
procedures, uniform application of comity principles, and mutual
recognition and enforcement of foreign awards. But FNC
problems would still persist with respect to Latin American coun-
Pyetranker, supra, at 226. The court based its decision, in part, in that the litigants
were multinational corporations with abundant resources, and in that the defendant
had agreed to transport evidence to New York. Id. at 227.
253. "The unilateral submission of the defendant to the jurisdiction of the
transferee court, coupled with the forced submission of the plaintiff, who is sent to its
own home courts after a dismissal on FNC grounds, is insufficient to create
jurisdiction 'by consent.'" Garro, supra note 8, at 98.
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tries not parties to such treaties. Therefore, to avoid discrimina-
tory effects in the application of FNC, most Latin American
countries should ratify those treaties.
In default of multilateral approaches to FNC, only unilateral
alternatives are available. Legislative reforms dealing with FNC
dismissals in Latin America have proven to be ineffective because
these amendments have addressed the issue of the infancy of
Latin American legal systems only partially.254 An overall reform
of the civil law system is needed in Latin America, thus address-
ing the consequences of mass tort litigation, including new
approaches to issues such as case consolidation, third party prac-
tice, discovery proceedings, evidence, and equitable money
awards. Also, stare decisis should be available for similar tort
cases. This specific approach would, to a certain degree, amelio-
rate the negative effects of FNC dismissals in Latin America by
bringing uniformity to cases where the facts are similar. Under
this new system, judicial delay would be unavoidable, but at least
a reasonable expectation of a fair award would exist.
More extreme approaches would include allowing Latin
American courts to grant Latin American plaintiffs awards in the
amounts they would have been entitled had they brought their
claims in U.S. courts. Even more, Latin American countries could
create special courts with the task of resolving disputes in which
U.S. defendants are involved. It remains to be seen if this type of
reverse discrimination would pass the constitutionality test in the
particular Latin American jurisdiction. If so, it should also be
determined whether such judgments would be enforceable in the
United States.
In the United States, FNC reforms by means of federal legis-
lation would achieve only limited results. A new statute would
bring the same problems as current FNC because it would be sub-
ject to judicial interpretation, and the courts will certainly find
new ways to dismiss foreign lawsuits to avoid the complications
caused by a sudden docket increase. Therefore, the solution must
come from inside of U.S. courts to be effective.
In sum, a regional treaty on FNC would be the optimal way
254. See generally Michael W. Gordon, Legal Cultures of Latin America and the
United States: Conflict or Merger?, 55 FLA. L. REV. 1 (2003); Felipe Sdez, The Nature
of Judicial Reform in Latin America and Some Strategic Considerations, 13 AM. U.
INT'L L. REV. 815 (1998); John W. Van Doren, Things Fall Apart, or Modern Legal
Mythology in the Civil Law Tradition: The Civil Law Tradition, 2 WIDENER J. PUB. L.
447 (1993); Jorge L. Esquirol, Continuing Fictions of Latin American Law, 55 FLA. L.
REV. 41 (2003).
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out of the. current FNC impasse. In default of such international
agreement, the second-best option would be that U.S. courts re-
interpret the FNC doctrine in order to provide it with more uni-
formity, and with a more restrictive approach, making it applica-
ble only in exceptional circumstances.
